I'm not so sure about that.
Yes they have overwhelming assets but assaults via sea are very very complex. No one has done it on a large scale against a powerful adversary on their home turf in 60+ years (I don't include the US into Kuwait or Basra etc).
To do so against an advanced, well trained military (possibly with the US in the background/helping) would result in huge losses for China. The window to cross the straight is probably only three months or so of the year. No doubt they could try smash it from a distance, cut off supplies etc and force concessions but a full on invasion would be dam tricky. Cyber attacks and Spetsnaz style sabotage may also help, especially as Taiwan has had a lot of spy scandals. However the Taiwanese people I've had the pleasure of working with are clever, cunning and courageous - those guys might lose but they are gonna give you a bloody nose trying to get in. Plus then the insurgency that follows would make Iraq look like a school yard bun fight. They have had decades to think purely about how to defend their own soil and a huge amount of people with both military training and advanced technical skills - who knows what tricks they might have up their sleeve or in the basement (Yun Feng missile for example can reach most major Chinese cities and has a fairly small warhead yet they didn't order many of them...Hmmm I wonder why?...Possibly it's older nuke program which was very advanced or the very large "defensive" chemical and biological program etc.)
Ultimately this is about the Communist Party looking for a balance. It doesn't want to lose face by losing Taiwan too much but at the same time but it would get a dam bloody nose trying to cross the straight...and then trying to occupy such a country. The end result likely to be a weakening of the party. Never forget Communists have shown themselves to be more concerned about the survival of the party than the people. Them taking a massive coin-toss strategic risk is unlikely, unless they feel pressured into doing it.
There are lots of people saying China would definitely win, so here is an interesting counter example to that.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/25/taiwan-can-win-a-war-wi...
Taiwan is an unenforceable and unself sufficient island well within Chinese strategic envelope. China, while imports heavily has _massive_ domestic resource extraction + industrial capabilities, i.e. China is not resource constrained like Japan. She does not need to venture outside to sustain a war economy. China on war economy can produce enough missiles and rocketry to make Taiwan Yemen, forever. There is quite literally, not a scenario where Taiwan and most of East Asian / ASEAN would not be perpetually crippled at China's whims if she is forced into North Korean / containment hermit geopolitics. Realistic China/Taiwan scenario, Chinese air trivially takes out Taiwanese military assets and gains air superiority, this is more or less accepted think tank reality since 2010s. China then destroys Taiwanese power generation. Without food / energy self sufficiency, limited strategic food reserves, Taiwan starts to starve in 3 months. Meanwhile, Chinese shore based rocketry can ensure no reinforcements / supplies ever lands on Taiwan proper, this is also think tank consensus - very few thinks USN could safely operate within Chinese shores anymore. Taiwan is worse off than Yemen who has land borders. China can do this today, and can maintain this indefinitely, all without ever landing a single boot on Taiwan proper, even if her people go back to eating rice and riding bicycles. Years of this and either Taiwan capitulates and is governed by puppet government or becomes dust. The only actor preventing this is USN.
>Ultimately this is about the Communist Party looking for a balance.
Beyond being a national project central to CCP legacy, Chinese security is not possible with an independant Taiwan. It's really that simple. There are strategic imperatives why Taiwan must be incorporated within Chinese sphere. The first best option is peaceful reunion, the second best option is forceful reunion, the third best option is turning Taiwan into dust. As long as Taiwan is independent, she is a massive threat, one that will be contained as soon as PRC is able to. Which is an force balance equation between China and US. When China makes her move, and IMO she will within 15-30 years, US has to decide if they want to risk reputation hit of being unable to provide security guarantee. This is why US military support for Taiwan is strategically ambiguous. Because US does not know they can aid Taiwan, while US can always contain China via Malacca or other SLOC chokepoints. 15-30 years from now even that is not guaranteed. This is why Pompeo is pushing for for friction, he wants confrontation sooner than later. Preferably after Taiwan loses semi dominance, and before Chinese military fully modernizes and break through containment choke points. This is 10-15 years from now.
E: reply too fast
@yyyk, this scenario is not optimal, but it's within possibility space if Chinese redlines / strategy is threatened (i.e. US base on Taiwan, Taiwan going nuke). The point is, it's possible today and will always be on the table going forward, especially if US presses for hot war containment before Chinese military modernizes. Which again, is a distinct possibility because it is within US long term interests. That's the critical window where everything goes to shit. As for bloc containing China, I have doubts, many countries, especially in the region benefit from multipolarity. Taiwan getting iced just means others in the region picking up their export markets. If China is in a position to challenge USN, it can challenge any bloc. If it comes down to turning Taiwan into Yemen, China will go hybrid warfare like Crimea, engineer scenario where Taiwan is aggressor for casus belli, i.e. Chinese ferry full of kids getting sunk by Taiwanese naval mine. Most in the region and IMO around the world just wants an excuse not to participate. Again like Crimea. Chinese actions in SCS is basically calibrated grayscale warfare, they've had lots of practice and success.
@yyyk2, no one is projected to have the ability counter-blockade China outside of USN unless there is massive coordinated coalition naval build up. Near record naval budget increases by the usual hypothetical containment allies (Japan/Korean/AU/India etc) will still be massively overshadowed by Chinese naval expansion plans for next 5 years. This is in context of Chinese military budget decreasing relative to GDP growth IIRC. TBF anyone outside of USN don't matter. IMO this is a China vs US battle. I'm curious what realist concerns if only because China taking over Taiwan by 2049 is been loudly broadcasted as national priority for 50+ years. Everyone saw this coming and hasn't really done anything about it, because fundamentally Taiwan outside of TSMC short term is not pressing to anyone's interests, and that is an unanticipated but fleeting condition. Not much is happening right now outside of posturing (QUAD, some planned exercises by UK, France/DE directing to ASEAN) while China is securing trade deals. Containing China is only significant to US interests. Everyone else is hedging, EU/East Asian/ASEAN hedges for good deals and US security subsidies, Africa/MENA would only lose since China's their biggest customer and MENA affairs directly affects EU domestic policy. but I don't see anyone else willing to hedge with blood and iron. The world doesn't care about Yemen and Crimea, nor HK/XJ/Tibet/SCS outside of platitudes and Chinese rhetoric on those issues were comparable than Taiwan but also tier less in order of importance. Conversely a contained hermit China can wreck all of East Asia / ASEAN, destabilize MENA which will reverberate throughout EU. In exchange for what? Resetting the power balance so US can solidify it hegemony more? IMO China executing plans on Taiwan is inevitable, and the only winner of dragging that out is US assuming they can contain China unscathed.
@Apocryphon, it's absolutely possible to engineer scenario where Taiwan initiated aggression and China is retaliating. The reason why US is hesitant to grant Taiwan unambiguous security guarantee is they can't rely on Taiwan not turning bold/stupid and initiating a confrontation that US doesn't want to get drawn in. It's in neither China nor US interests to have Taiwan determine her own future. As long as China can cobble together a casus belli, she gives everyone else and excuse to sit out, regardless of how believable the excuse is. Keep in mind ROC / Taiwan tried to blockade most of Chinese shores via "port closure" declarations for decades, and flew US funded U2s over PRC airspace. The civil war never ended, lots bygone historic excuses to leverage with new developments to muddle waters. I think if one evaluates actual interests, which I articulated paragraph above, most countries are looking for an excuse not to intervene.
Starving Taiwan into submission is at best case scenario a massive hit to China's foreign and economic relations (ensuring a block analog to NATO just to counter China) in order to get an economically devastated province, with possible internal stability hit since eventually Chinese citizens will know what it cost.
This isn't a good tradeoff for the CCP, unless they are so strong 15-30 years from now that they get the same dominance US had in 90s (in which case they probably can get Taiwan anyway without paying that price), or if there's an internal threat that must be appeased ASAP.
E: China can do your scenario physically, and probably avoid the world's wrath in the immediate military term. Nonetheless, the world will see a popular first-world society reduced to rubble, and other first-world societies will see themselves in the wreckage.
No matter the excuse, there's no way there won't be a mass reaction afterwards. Sure, other countries may well avoid taking direct part in the immediate hostilities, but soon after you'll see a counter-block if only due to realist concerns (after all, if China can get away with that the world is already multi-polar).
If war happens, I expect an attempt at a quick military win and slow starvation if and only if the ordinary military efforts outright fail; And the alternative being humiliating defeat which the CCP can't afford, and the CCP doesn't get some face saving way to climb down.
IMHO, at any other scenario it's better for the CCP to sacrifice men and win in an ordinary manner than to get much of the world to unite against it.
I think you massively underestimate the psychological effect of seeing a first-world country reduced to a third-world country if Taiwan doesn't surrender very quickly. Also, the realist concern is classic 'balance the strongest power' dynamic.
I don't think China has to worry about an outright official blockade, but you'll end up with a Cold War rerun and Chinese companies being unofficially driven off the West, SK and Japan working together, possible SK/Japan nukes at the very least. China played a lot of cards trying to keep other countries not ganged up against it, best not ruin it to get a devastated province. Simply put, any starvation scenario where Taiwan decides to fight will be a disaster for CCP too.
So I believe any CCP strategist understands it's better to sacrifice men and take Taiwan outright without turning it to Yemen (a preference which you stated as well). A quick enough operation will be ignored by the world for reasons you provided, and they may well be in a position to do that soon. The 'wait out months/years and publicly starve out Taiwan' is incredibly poor in comparison.
The reason I dismiss quick invasion is for all the reasons analyst cite why invading Taiwan would be hard. Landing operations on Taiwan scale has never been done before. It will massively outscope Normandy. I question if it's even feasible. Let alone quick. Especially with massively telescoped logistics movement that US/TW can rapidly react to. Whereas quick air superiority and naval blockade is the kind of campaign that can be disguised with annual exercises. The main reason cited for why PRC would want a quick invasion is to prevent US intervention on Taiwan proper... but US lost that option. So it's not a relevant factor. And it shows in actual Chinese military acquisitions very few additions to amphibious capabilities, massive blue water naval buildup. PRC's only concern so far seems to be circumventing US counter-blockade. There's almost no credible movement towards amphib capabilities outside of notional signalling exercises with ~100 amphib tanks total. PRC sent 900+ tanks to Russia for military exercises. I would not presume an invasion until China properly invests in amphib capabilities.
SK/Japan working together... I doubt with their history. Ditto with Japan nuclearizing against their constitution. If they did, there'd be no reason to host US bases. I don't actually think China has played a lot of cards so far, there's just a lack of coordination in the region because... everyone fucking hates each other. Japan/Korean/China hate triangle. SCS is a 6 party dispute. ASEAN has divided loyalties. There's only a vague consensus that the future is Asian, and US is useful to hedge against China, but not at the expense of sabotaging everyone's collective future. As for EU/Anglos, maybe. But at the end of the day, Taiwan is full of yellow people. 1st world countries stood by while secular, liberalizing brown countries got repressed back to poverty by US foreign intervention. My opinion is they'll stand at sidelines if China is sufficient local hegemon, especially if the realist want China to check against US. EU has their own foreign policy aspirations after all. Multipolarity means EU + China against US. Or at least EU not teaming up with US against China. EU + China has their own interest alignments. Both EU and China require maritime hydro carbon trade as existential matter. China having parity blue water navy as US to also secure trade routes is good for everyone who wants to continue to freeload. And unlike US, EU knows China has to provide this service indefinitely, and is reliable if core interests respected (like Taiwan). Ultimately, if west wants to divest from China, it's survivable. They account for 10% of Chinese GDP. If you told Xi today to take a 10% hit on GDP in exchange for Taiwan, he'd take that deal.
Of course peaceful is always preferable. It's just hard to see how that could be charted right now. My gut feeling is cracking down on HK is reset of one country two systems, 30 years is a long time to mold HK into a more enticing alternative than one country one system. I think Taiwan can get away with some sort of suzerainty option with understanding that it's only delaying the inevitable.
A. Siege type pressure when one lets food in (or food is passed in anyway) have extremely poor success rate since WW2. Note that Yemen itself wasn't conquered (given the terrain and people, any idea of conquering it was laughable in the first place). Eventually PLA will either go Yemen, attack directly, or stop. All options are bad or worse than just attacking without trying a siege.
B. SK and Japan will band if threat is deemed extreme enough. Or go nuke.
C. The typically discussed invasion scenario is very tilted towards what American Marines did in WW2. A smart PLA would instead be far more aggressive on exploiting its air superiority, upto mobilizing sea assets after the air attack or even doing a Crete 1941 style attack. There are things Taiwan can do to defend, but it hasn't yet and I am not sure it's going to happen.