I can think of two situations where design dictates you need passwords to be recoverable, but even though they exist you can (and I do :)) argue the design is wrong:
- Online aggregators like Mint/Yodlee/etc. that pass through your credentials and use screen scraping to get your data. Obviously a faulty design but in the financial aggregator case it's kind of your only choice and many customers are willing to accept the tradeoff.
- I've heard policy enforcement (e.g. "Your current password must not contain any of your N previous passwords and must meet [set of strength criteria]") used as an excuse but I don't really buy it. Not having access to the original password limits your choices for future policy enforcement (to what you could derive from the password when first set) but with a little foresight and extra work you can do fine just with hashes.
Ironically, those policies make you significantly less secure. First, you are storing previous and current passwords in a reversible format. Second, the more difficult your policies, the more likely your users are to treat the password insecurely (PostIt note on the monitor, etc).
Another policy I've seen is "passwords must differ by at least N characters". Again, how many hashes do you need to store for a 16 character password?
For any trivial policy ("don't add numbers to the end", storing the extra hashes will work. All the password policy systems I've seen allow too many axes of freedom for that.