No Secret Software!
tbray.org
tbray.org
The problem is that to have any benefit from having an open source solution, all of the code in the system needs to be open source, including all of the drivers etc. As drivers need to be adapted to the specific hardware that they run on, it is normally only the manufacturer of the equipment that can write them. Think video drivers in Linux, as an example. Hardware manufacturers probably see little commercial advantage in providing their source code, and even if they do, there is no guarantee that what they give out as source code is really what they have loaded into the voting machine.
If no one gets rich on the design and implementation of electronic voting systems, that's fine. I'd rather see it run by well-intentioned, poorly-paid academics within a strict peer-review model than by unknown private entities.
"On May 16, 2008 the Dutch government decided that elections in the Netherlands will be held using paper ballots and red pencil only. A proposal to develop a new generation of voting computers was rejected."
* The code is publicly available
* The code is publicly verifiable - eg, every voter is provided with a 'voting receipt' with a non-identifying UUID and their voting results. Users are allowed to look up this info online at any time they wish.
If so, I agree. But I think making that code public reduces the risk of it being malicious. Eg, for one you've already made it so that the malware must be implemented as a trojan, rather than being obvious. The other is the code would be under massive scrutiny (hopefully without the developers OKing changes without actually looking at what they do, ala OpenSSL).
"Moral
The moral is obvious. You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself. (Especially code from companies that employ people like me.) No amount of source-level verification or scrutiny will protect you from using untrusted code. In demonstrating the possibility of this kind of attack, I picked on the C compiler. I could have picked on any program-handling program such as an assembler, a loader, or even hardware microcode. As the level of program gets lower, these bugs will be harder and harder to detect. A well installed microcode bug will be almost impossible to detect."
I would be awfully surprised, if people who made millions (from Verisign) by "looking" at ssl would have made that kind of a mistake (effectively freedom frying the French National Guard).
I agree that you have to look at every element of the chain, but my point is that you can construct such a trusted chain that goes all the way from the hardware to the vote-tallying software. There is still some potential for hackery in the hardware, but that could also be ruled out by designing and implementing some open hardware - a project which, I'm sure, would gather plenty of support from the open source community.
One of the cool things about social problems is they don't need exact solutions. If you can solve things for 99.9% or even 99% of the cases, that's considered good enough when it comes to people
You can't fully trust code unless you've created it entirely yourself.
That doesn't mean that code you have not fully created yourself which is available to scrutinize has the same level of risk as code which you have not created that is secret.
Nor does Thompson say it is in his article - read it again.
Reliable and trustworthy voting is the linchpin of democracy. There is no excuse for voting "irregularities" in this day and age.