Not quite. Their argument is based around running "full nodes", which is made-up term for a non-mining node that stores a full copy of the blockchain. (There's nothing wrong with having the whole chain, but the fallacy here is that "full nodes" don't protect the network, it is miners that secure the network and it is miners who decide what transactions to uptake)

It's all moot though, because introducing sidechains and the lightning network destroys the value of Bitcoin in a perverted attempt to save it from a non-existent problem.

> Keeping it spread out across millions of individual home computers, laptops, and mobile devices is the strongest, and perhaps only defense of that.

No, because Bitcoin was built to be resilient to Sybil attacks, that's why it's proof-of-work and not proof-of-stake. So it doesn't matter if a million people in Africa have the whole blockchain on their raspberry pis or laptop or whatever, because all I need is one ASIC mega-farm in Antarctica and I can double spend attack the network into oblivion.

It's hashpower that protects and secures the network, nothing else. This is one point that the fraud CSW actually got right.