- Plane was bad, so they band-aided it in factory, but band-aid keeps falling off sometimes. So planes stay grounded.
- Sure, they can make better band-aid but everyone knows planes are bad designed so it won't help much (even if super safe band-aid)
- Correct way is to rebuild the plane to make it good, but this is/was out of the table - it was already way too expensive in the first place.
And here we are.
Boeing management made a decision to sell dual sensors as an option package, cutting the base model down to one single AoA sensor per MCAS. (there are two MCAS systems to provide redundancy)
It was already built adequately, the decision to cut corners on safety to try and leverage a small profit was the problem.
Dual AoA sensors as part of the standard option package and providing adequate training to pilots would have prevented all of this.
One sensor per MCAS means that only one sensor is used at a time, so if it is installed incorrectly or is faulty. The faulty data is fed into the MCAS. This is what caused the crashes.
The more expensive option packages included dual-AoA sensors. Two AoA sensors per MCAS, and then an AoA disagree alarm that would alert the pilot that the AoA sensors are not in agreement.
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=1...
The AoA sensors on the standard model were meant to be redundant, not work together. Boeings fixes are making the sensors work together, while sacrificing what they originally designed as redundancy.
Boeing is intentionally trying to suggest what you are which frames the problem as a mistake
In reality these systems were meant to be redundant, and not linked together, so they're taking a sensor meant for a failover system and combining it into a single system to create this 'workaround'