https://web.archive.org/web/20061215050427/http://www.matasa...
Agent-based endpoint management is super convenient and is mainstream in modern IT management. But nobody grows up wanting to write the communications software for enterprise server inventory software, so the code quality on these products, which are ubiquitous, is awful. But 99% of enterprise buyers aren't even slightly motivated by software security when making purchasing decisions, and everyone knows it, so vendors buy fig-leaf audits from vendors who will sell public-facing documents for 2p1w engagements, and IT purchasers, whose performance reviews are based on completing projects and not protecting their companies from $500,000 purchase orders for what is effectively malware, accept those bogus reviews and get on with their lives.
Nothing is going to change about this, because nothing is going to alter the incentives. Reporters like Nicole Perlroth will try to blame it on ex-NSA hired guns (as if you needed the exploit chains NSA buys to break any of these systems), but I can't think of any realistic policy that could be applied to stop these kinds of attacks, not without massively disrupting the technology industry at the same time.
Best get used to it, is I guess my point. I mean that sincerely, not as a sort of appeal to right the ship; the ship is already upside down.