IMHO Bloomberg is trying to break this story without giving malicious actors useful information.
As a proof of concept experiment, I hacked together an Mcu, a few caps, resistors, diodes, and a small power transistor to see what could be done on a "single component" attack. I was able to receive data and inject malicious messaging into the data from a serial eeprom using a "filter capacitor" made up of my device (only 2 wires, 1 to signal, 1 to ground)
Obviously, not having access to a fab or able to integrate microscale circuits, my device would have been trivially detected (about 1 cubic centimeter) but with access to a fab and a bespoke lab, I have no doubt it could be manufactured down to the size of a standard filter capacitor (~3mm3).
I do not know if this is what malicious actors would do or not, but if I can build a 2 wire device to compromise the data loaded from serial flash, then any state actor can. If you compromise this data on the control firmware for a PC, you own the board.
All of the claims that the hardware attack is fanciful are clearly naieve, based on my experiment.
It is worth mentioning that the attack that I experimentally replicated is the hard version. The easy one is to substitute a modified device for the serial eeprom itself... Also invisible, and orders of magnitude more potent. A compromised eeprom could include advanced features including large amounts of storage and built in rf communication capabilities.
The naysayers in this case saying that the attack would be technically infeasible or excessively difficult to implement undetected are simply wrong from a technical point of view.
Compromised devices could be mass manufactured for < 10usd each, and if you can get a reel of them into a manufacturers supply chain, you can permenantly compromise thousands of devices with a single attack. The required tech is within reach of any state actor with access to a fab.