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Why not simply require the hibernation image is stored on a LUKS partition?

Then nobody can tamper with the image, since the LUKS key is derived from the TPM...

Then you get to reuse all the existing kernel infrastructure rather than reinventing the encryption wheel...

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> Then nobody can tamper with the image, since the LUKS key is derived from the TPM...

How do you avoid root having access to it?

Simply don't allow root to write to partitions that would be eligible for resume?

Ie. if it's swap on LUKS, writes are disallowed and resume can happen. In all other situations, writes are allowed, but resume cannot.

There isn't a thread safe way for root to write to a swap partition while it's in use anyway, and I'm not even sure if the current kernel allows that.

How do you suggest enforcing that root can't write to a LUKS swap partition? Root knows the key, root can write to block devices, what's stopping me from disabling swap and writing a backdoored image to the partition with a user-space implementation of LUKS?

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