It's hard to see what value this adds over something like Duck Duck Go. Yes, it means the search provider can't see your IP... but there are other ways to do that, and you're trusting private.sh with your query and IP anyway.
It's hard to see what value this adds over something like Duck Duck Go. Yes, it means the search provider can't see your IP... but there are other ways to do that, and you're trusting private.sh with your query and IP anyway.
If you take a look at the javascript, the query is absolutely encrypted before private.sh can see it. In other words, private.sh cannot see it.
Instead, what private.sh provides is a decoupling of your identity from your search query.
Private.sh can see your IP, but cannot see your search query.
The search engine can see your search query, but cannot see your IP.
Hope this helps clarify and thanks for the input! The search provider is constantly improving search results -- we'll be seeing significantly improved results over time!
How do I automatically validate that the JS hasn't changed between visits on my mobile?
(This is the problem with zero-knowledge-via-JS-delivery platforms that I've been unable to solve to date)
https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-subresource-integrity/
As written, it's more about a page validating the asset from a CDN, but it wouldn't be hard to also have a browser extension which pops up an SSL-like badge when all script resources on a page are marked as trusted by some validating third party.
(This also applies to builds of client software, but for most operating systems those builds have to be signed with a private key, which makes them more difficult to compromise. On Linux, SHA256 checksums are usually provided alongside binaries - which are especially important to use against security-related client software.)
[0] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Subres...
[1] https://w3c-test.org/subresource-integrity/subresource-integ...
But I'm willing to bet 1Password and the like never trusted third parties to host <link> and <script> assets anyway.
While browsers support these headers I don't think any currently reject a page or resource if a digest doesn't match. But at least the mechanism is there.
There's also the draft [2] for signed HTTP messages. So a response can be signed and verified against a public key.
[0] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Di...
[1] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Wa...
[2] https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-cavage-http-signatures-10.ht...
If the file itself that's being served was compromised, the web server will serve it with a new digest that matches.
Looks like it works on (mobile) Safari as well, which is fantastic.
Note that one still must fully trust the root resource (the HTML response that bootstraps the web app). Whatever generates or stores that response up until it is wrapped in TLS is just as vulnerable.
But can you actually prove it? The search provider isn't disclosed, we don't even know if it exists at all (as a separate entity).
Perhaps start with a statement like: "Private.sh sends all of your searches to a 3rd party search engine. These searches are private because we prevent the 3rd party search engine from knowing your IP or fingerprinting your browser. Private.sh can't see your searches because they are encrypted in your browser and can only be decrypted at the 3rd party search engine."
"Thus, the 3rd party search engine only sees your search, not your IP or browser finger print."
Thank you so much for your help and input!
And if private.sh can unilaterally modify the js, that doesn't mean much.
Also at some point the request has to be decrypted to send it on to the real search engine. You're also trusting private.sh to do that without deanonoymizing you. [Edit: appearently this step is done by gigablast, which is a separate company. That's at least a good thing. You're still trusting that both parties are acting honestly and competently]
In other words. If you trust private.sh not to be evil, then sure it works. But if we're just blindly assuming providers are good, we might as well just use google.
[1] https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/privatesh-private-...
[2] https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/private-sh-pr...
> The search engine can see your search query, but cannot see your IP.
Should add: this will hold true until both are acquired, or one sell their part of the logs to a data broker - the party acquiring both, can correlate the data after - and if one party sell its half of the data the other half can acquire it...
(supplement with: we promise not to log data... Until ownership changes) .
With a normal proxy, a passive attack on the proxy is enough (since it will have both the request IP and search term in memory together at some point).
Whether this is indeed a meaningfully different threat model for most users is an interesting question.