>Well, that's not what I, as a layman, meant. What I meant was Orch-OR and it is at least a good starting point.
Very well, I shall look again, but color me (extremely) skeptical. Are you able to propose a mechanism by which quantum mechanics can explain qualia?
I have yet to see even a partial mechanism. The issue is that qualia specifically involves something non-mechanistic. You would have to first qualify what the substance of qualia is (it's ontology ... and good luck with that!), how it emerges from quantum-mechanical phenomena, and whence it comes (where is the stuff of qualia when it's not manifesting?).
Again, I don't (yet?) see how any mechanistic explanation can explain this.
>Please let me know If i'm talking nonsense :).
It's not nonsense per se, but none of it addresses the key criticism. You must explain how that causal chain (microtubules -> mitochondria -> neurotransmitter) produces qualia.
Your argument is effectively that microtubules can influence the creation of thought. Great! So can neurons! So can drugs! So can a blow to the head! Why insist on microtubules?? Why not elsewhere?
>You've given up already.
I've also given up on proving the existence of God!
Less facetiously: phenomenology has the advantage of being self-evident. We're all pretty much convinced that it exists, contrary to God. Given that, and given the advances in materialist philosophy, it's not prima facie crazy to suspect that phenomenology is a physical process, and therefore amenable to scientific explanation. In this, you have a point.
However, I don't think science (or philosophy for that matter) currently has the ability to propose an explanation for how some process p implements qualia. We don't even know what such a theory would look like. As such, the quantum-mechanical argument really does seem like the pituitary gland of the 21st century.
>The mainstream theory is an absolute non-explanation
Which mainstream theory? Are you referring to access consciousness? If so, then you are basing your argument on a false premnise, namely that these scientists are investigating the same thing as you. They are not. They are interested in another thing we call consciousness, which may or may not be related to the phenomenological consciousness that you are interested in. It's still an interesting question.
If you're referring to mainstream theory of phenomenology (e.g. sensorimotor theory), it is at the very least no more absurd than quantum-mechanical theories.
>Yes, the HN crowd surely loves to downvote these type of posts.
Respectfully, have you considered the possibility that your ideas just don't add up? I mean no disrespect, and again will take another look (links welcome), but I notice that you have not addressed the central question of how a mechanism (let alone yours, specifically) can produce a qualia. I suspect this is what motivates the downvotes.