The Thoughts of a Spiderweb (2017)
quantamagazine.org
quantamagazine.org
Huh. Photos of these webs were featured in a Time-Life book on drugs my parents left out for me in the 1960's. My brother and I were entranced, perhaps not the intended effect. Each web did convey the drug in question.
Years later I described these spiderwebs to the storyboard artists for "A Beautiful Mind", influencing the "mad shack" set design.
I was pondering the nature of consciousness, particularly the barriers between a social species, eusocial species, and singular mind. My brain is made up of neurons, but there's no discernible consciousness to them individually, there's just my mind. Is a herd of cattle a mind in a similar way? What about a bee hive? Is the distinction simply a function of bandwidth or latency? Is the distinction based on some organizational principle? Something else?
What this article kind of argues (or frames someone else's argument) is that there is no fundamental distinction, just an apparent and illusory one. If you offload memory and information processing tasks externally, for example, taking a list or using an abacus, do those tools become a part of your mind? If you cooperate with another person, do you both become part of each other's minds? The perspective laid out in the article argues yes, when you offload cognitive tasks outside of your brain, the tools with which you do that are a part of your mind. It is very interesting to consider.
We don't see it this way for some evolutionary reason, but distrupt the communication between the two brain hemispheres and you start to see how much of our concept of indivisible, independent self is made up after the fact by parts that create coherent pictures of the work of other parts, which takes time and by parts that reflect on this, which takes even more time. By the time this coherent self emerges most of the work is done, and a large amount of it is not initiated by it, rather observed. We are of course capable to set things in motion with this slow coherent self, but effective behavior comes from learning to push all the work to the faster parts, which are either already specialized (cognitive biases, heuristics) can be specialized (learning, habits) or even external like tools and people.
Organizations can be seen as an extension of this, like a frontal frontal lobe. Organizations are basically slow thinkers, with procedures to control cognitive biases. Societies are even more complex and slow, but they too mirror this hierachical organization.
Calculators make people dumber. A slide rule is like a trombone; you slide to your best guess, then listen to the sound and home in on the note. An abacus trains the mind to no longer need an abacus.
In the future the most capable humans will be those who coevolve with external tools. This has long been the case, but we're entering a realm where those tools are increasingly cognitive. Mathematics is a nice microcosm for the tension here: It attracts people with unusual gifts who are certain those gifts are sufficient to proceed as if today is 1790. Others, perhaps not so gifted, but with a greater brain plasticity who welcome these external tools, are having a field day.
OK...
> For the octopus, with thousands of suckers studding symmetric arms, each of which can bend at any point, building a central mental representation of how to move seems like a computational nightmare. But experiments show that the octopus doesn’t do that. “The brain doesn’t have to know how to move this floppy arm,” Cheng said. Rather, the arm knows how to move the arm.
How is this supposed to explain anything? The computational problem is the same whether you solve it with neurons located in the head or neurons located in the arm...?
Like the main brain can say “move leg” and doesn’t need to worry about how exactly that leg achieves its goal.
This is a perfectly reasonable thing to say, but it tends to conflict with the article's own interpretation of what it's saying.
For example, the image captioned "Octopus movements are too complex to be centrally coordinated."
Their point does not appear to be that you can save on energy budget by storing the arm software in the arm, so that it goes away when the arm does. Rather, they seem to be saying that it's possible for the arm software to solve problems that would be too computationally complex to solve, if you were trying to solve them inside the head instead of the arm.
I think its just an example of how it might be simpler to distribute the load. It's usually simpler to build multiple cheap things than one big expensive thing. We see this with CPUs: our supercomputers aren't single core monsters, but instead thousands of desktop class CPUs strung up in parallel and we distribute our computing jobs across an array of them because this is much cheaper.
The interesting conclusion is that spiders use their web as a computer. Both to store data in, and to preprocess information.