That gulf is readily filled with a garden-variety VPN, which works if you're doing the kind of thing where you don't want the web site keeping tabs on you but figure the VPN's reputation is enough to keep them logging your connection and doing something nefarious with that information.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-ns...
Not everyone is the five eyes, and Tor is useful in some limited cases against them, too.
In fact, I'd go one step further and recommend that if your freedom or life is at risk, then don't use computers or phones to do things that states might execute or imprison you for at all.
There are other ways of correlating those connections (like browser fingerprinting), but the connection pool isn't a problem.
Additionally, lots of analytics services do TCP fingerprinting.
So they likely know it was you, if you didn't change TCP window sizes, TTLs and options (which I assume due to web browsers reusing the native OS's tcp stack).
Also if you didn't use ublock0, they will get an even better footprint via fingerprintjs (most common) that's probably as unique as it gets across your commune without having to know your exact IP.
Responding to OP's "whether or not the connection remains open". IFF it remains open, then it's no longer a matter of correlating.
Imagine this scenario:
1. User visits a site in normal mode. Browser opens connection A. Browser uses connection A to fetch the site. Browser leaves connection A open.
2. User opens private mode. User visits the same site. Browser opens connection B to fetch the site.
How does it matter that connection A was left open if some other connection was used to fetch the site in private mode? If that's not the case, then its a big deal - but that requires some sort of evidence and not just wild hand waving that it could be the case.