Comments:
* this is a great read about security and OAuth: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics... written by experienced folks.
* don't use the implicit grant, please. Use the authorization code grant with PKCE. Here's an example (from a doc I helped write, talking about how bad the implicit grant is: https://fusionauth.io/learn/expert-advice/oauth/modern-guide...
* State can be used for CSRF protection but I've also seen it used to convey, well, state that needs to be carried over. That's legitimate, but make sure you append a random value as suggested.
* The well known endpoints will only be present if the OAuth server supports RFC 8414: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8414 but you can always check the documentation. Most OAuth servers have plenty of public documentation to make their usage easier.
* Re "Flawed redirect_uri validation", the OAuth 2.1 spec has tightened this up some and wants exact URI matching. We have some customers who want wildcard matching, but the redirect_uri check is a fundamental part of the OAuth security architecture, so we've resisted that request.
* "However, by stealing an OAuth code or token, the attacker can gain access to the user's account in their own browser." is a good reminder that you should keep your token lifetimes short. We recommend minutes; use a refresh token to renew the token.
All in all, thought provoking article. There's a reason why more and more teams are outsourcing auth; there's a lot of flexibility in the specs and it's easy to make mistakes. Even when you do it right the first time, there's ongoing maintenance. You should run a bug bounty program and/or regularly pentest your system.