I remain pretty strongly agnostic about all this but I don't think you can escape it easily. One interesting thing to me would be what it would mean for some _rich_ far off signal to be picked up. It seems relatively easy for the universe to maintain a low fidelity simulation about rocks and radiation in space at a distance (plus or minus things like dark matter!) But if we suddenly started receiving broadcasts from an alien civilisation, or even met them face to face, that would be two very rich and detailed timelines that would suddenly have to snap into sync. That's certainly not something I'd allow if I had to build and maintain this stuff (and one can only assume unreasonable deadlines and budgets are universal).
And there's no reason why simulation requires everything to be simulated at the same time. Stars could be modeled as point masses, and only calculated in more detail when someone looks at them.
Take a look at the mandelbrot set https://math.hws.edu/eck/js/mandelbrot/MB.html infinite fractal complexity, shown using limited space + time.
[1]: https://www.drdobbs.com/jvm/an-algorithm-for-compressing-spa...
Even space complexity classes are not necessarily an issue. If the simulation runs out of storage, you can always suspend it, go provision more, and then resume it. The people in the simulation would never notice their suspension. It would only be a hard limit if some computation required more storage than could ever be provisioned, such as more bits than could fit in the observable universe. However, I doubt accurately simulating the contents of all contemporary human minds would need anywhere near that many bits.
In computer graphics terms. Culling. Objects are not simulated if u have no direct observer.
As Berkeley said, esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived)
That's one of the reasons why the simulation argument interests me. I think it may give one a reason to choose idealism over materialism. Idealism has a greater "simulation resistance" than materialism has. To a materialist, the question of whether we are living in a simulation may seem profound. An idealist can just shrug their shoulders.
A materialist has identified material reality as the most fundamental reality, and so the possibility that apparent material reality is not really the most fundamental reality does in some ways threaten the materialist worldview. For an idealist, for whom conscious minds and their experiences (qualia) are the most fundamental reality, the question of whether we are in a simulation is simply a question about whether their exist conscious minds who have the experience simulating us – and that may or may not be true, but either way it makes no difference to who or what we fundamentally are.