> Many proprietary applications can only be successfully installed under sudo or the root account which is a nice and easy way to compromise a computer.
This isn't even worded very well for the common threat vector in this cases which is `curl | sudo bash`.
The truth is that the threat actors targeting Linux almost always do so by "living off the land". A lot of those files are benign or customized to the system leaving the common hash identification method of identifing known malicious binaries as a non-starter. Checking compiled libraries and binaries for sub-classes of behavior also doesn't get very far due to the wide variance of versions across different distributions and customizations done by different administrators.
There are a lot of ways to detect or preventing those changes to the system that are actively deployed (none of which are an anti-virus).
There is a chance that true behavior based analysis can provide hints towards compromise and all the BPF tooling around that makes it a potentially promising lead, but no anti-virus I'm aware of is doing that while other auditing tools are.
There are also a lot of risks with an anti-virus itself. To be useful it needs to be deep in the kernel, above root permissions watching everything. Usually these are proprietary and all the major anti-virus names have had security issues in the past. Un-audited proprietary code running inside the Linux kernel is always a sketchy proposition.
Which leads us back to the common conclusion that no, Linux does not need an anti-virus. They don't solve any of the security problems mentioned and will consume a large amount of system resources to accomplish nothing.