Peter Sunde: dark.fail domain was hijacked through fake court order
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Similar processes are in place for other (very systems, and paper based processes don't protect against this. We have the technology to avoid this (digital signatures), and yet they are not used!
A good reason to ensure that systems are built securely on the assumption upstream providers (including DNS) can be compromised by an adversary, regardless of how much you may think you trust the provider. If someone cares enough, they'll get certificates issued under your domain by doing something like this. Adding more lines of defence certainly makes sense to prevent this - don't let DNS, and ultimately emailed bits of paper, become your single point of failure for confidentiality in a system!
[0] https://domainnamewire.com/2018/11/08/namecheap-and-tucows-s...
Returning the domain to it’s previous criminal operators might not be the best idea either. Other very similar sites have faced issues with the DOJ.
Why should namecheap shut down a potential law enforcement operation targeting darknet criminals?
Would you say the same if 30% of the links on the site were to child pornography? Why does it matter that some of the links on the page were to legit content? DDW did the same and was still shut down by the DOJ.
> and the page itself is not illegal
I doubt that there are many places in the world where getting paid to distribute links to darknet drug markets isn’t illegal. The US certainly isn’t one of those places.
There'd be nothing surprising about this. It isn't a point in favour of the court order being "fake".
When the takeover of Hansa [0], a collaboration between German and Dutch LE, happened they did actually alter the code of the website in ways identical to phishing. Collecting usernames, passwords, and location information.
[0] https://www.wired.com/story/hansa-dutch-police-sting-operati...