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Comment by tptacek | Hacker News Reader

It's a basic research tool used in viral vaccinology. The US had a ban on GoF research that was rescinded in 2018 in part so GoF work could be conducted on MERS.

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Important detail: it wasn't even a ban. It was a moratorium that prevented public funding for GoF research. Privately funded research was still allowed.

Thanks! My only point here is to push back on any idea that GoF research on viruses is unprecedented or necessarily malign.

If a basic research tool kills 3.5 million people, then maybe it should stop being a basic research tool.

I do not think it is basic and, in the field, hugely controversial. They tried really hard to keep that discussion inside the field, not allowing the general public to have a say in if they want to tax-fund the creation of pandemic-potential viruses in BSL2 labs. Stuxnet would be comparable to GoF coronavirus. Stuxnet also got out and hit Germany. Think they did that to research better virus scanners?

> The Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) and the Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) have systematically thwarted efforts by the White House, the Congress, scientists, and science policy specialists to regulate GoF research of concern and even to require risk-benefit review for projects involving GoF research of concern.

> In 2014, the Obama White House implemented a “Pause” in federal funding for GoF research of concern. However, the document announcing the Pause stated in a footnote that: “An exception from pause may be obtained if head of funding agency determines research is urgently necessary to protect public health or national security”. Unfortunately, the NIAID Director and the NIH Director exploited this loophole to issue exemptions to projects subject to the Pause –preposterously asserting the exempted research was “urgently necessary to protect public health or national security”– thereby nullifying the Pause.

> In 2017, the Trump Administration announced a Potential Pandemic Pathogens Control and Oversight (P3CO) Framework that implemented a requirement for risk-benefit review of GoF research of concern. However, the P3CO Framework relies on the funding agency to flag and forward proposals for risk-benefit review. Unfortunately, the NIAID Director and the NIH Director have declined to flag and forward proposals for risk-benefit review, thereby nullifying the P3CO Framework.

I'm sitting next to someone who now works in the field and he disagrees with you. Moreover, you wrote a comment upthread suggesting that the real driver for all this work is military contracts, which is simply false. Perhaps you & I are best off not litigating this.

With what specifically? All of it, even the quote? If we are going to do an appeal to Oracle authority by proxy, I should at least get to interrogate it, and I agree, that would get tedious fast. Maybe he can comment?

I am not really suggesting the real driver of GoF of concern is military contracts, except maybe when looking at public funding sources.

> Meticulous investigation of U.S. government databases reveals that Pentagon funding for the EcoHealth Alliance from 2013 to 2020, including contracts, grants and subcontracts, was just under $39 million. Most, $34.6 million, was from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which is a branch of the DOD which states it is tasked to “counter and deter weapons of mass destruction and improvised threat networks.”

> Most of the remaining money to EHA was from USAID (State Dept.), comprising at least $64,700,000 (1). These two sources thus total over $103 million.

https://www.independentsciencenews.org/news/peter-daszaks-ec...

I do think our back-and-forth can be useful, at least I learned something and removed some uncertainties.

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