It inevitably gets connected to resources which can cost money, and since it's an internal infrastructure system, it will inevitably be connected with resources which contain replicas of private information. "Because why not, it's an internal system which means it's perfectly safe, and we should really be testing with real user data, you know, for realism."
And once you cross that bridge, you have wholly and truly gone completely radioactive. This is the intersection of financial risk/attack surface and private customer data, and execution of unproven code. If we send new Groovy scripts through an approval process, we can at least narrow the risk of accident or intentional disclosure by manually vetting scripts before they are run for the first time after changes, (or effective sandboxing so they cannot escape and access for example, any secrets that were not intended for them.) But, roundly, one can argue there's not much to be done, as it is an internal system, and each control we place in the way can easily be seen as an obstacle to getting the job done straightforwardly.
Then think of this also: maintaining Jenkins is known to be an operational burden, to say the least. If you have different departments with their own independent need for Jenkins or something like it, neither of these departments is going to want to own the Jenkins instance if it means being generally responsible for uptime and upkeep. You can bet that someone higher up is going to see this as a tremendous opportunity to consolidate and save money. They're going to wind up running on the same environment together, operated by someone who has no idea what either of these departments is really up to.
If you're lucky it's only two tenants, and that shared-service admin department responsible for the Jenkins instance is going to actively pursue the common interest of keeping things secure on behalf of everyone. What's more likely is, shared services platform team only ever hears from their Jenkins customers when something has ceased to function and their Admin access is needed, and for those people it's basically hair-on-fire can't-work-until the admin guy can be reached. After ten or fifteen times and some political pressure, their boss says this is taking too much of our department's time and we're not adding value, so they decide to shirk the admin duties, and give admin credentials to a "designee" from each team.
Now through diffusion of responsibility, nobody is in charge, and everyone is too afraid of breaking anyone else's stuff to ever upgrade even the most basic stuff.
That's right, now you have potentially private customer data, from multiple departments, with access to secrets that may control resources which can be scaled up to cost money, in an environment where code runs for the first time (potentially even code from third party contributors, but not likely if it's an internal instance... right? ...) code running before it has been tested by anyone, in a multi-tenant environment that nobody wants to pay or spend time to maintain, with competing czars that don't really have much incentive to talk to each other, where nobody has enough visibility to safely upgrade anything for fear it will break something and step on somebody else's toes, and if it goes down or stops functioning for basically any possible reason because of any of those teams, the maintenance of business is completely halted until we take care of it; really it's basically even worse than having cats and dogs living in the same house.
Sure, you can implement policy to solve any one of these things individually, but if you write enough policy to make it truly safe, then people will hate you for all the red tape required to work with it, "why can't we do the easy thing which is technically possible" and as you can see, there is so much wrong possible that even the best policy is going to have to concede some things, to make this tremendous expense worthwhile "otherwise why are we even using (footgun) if I can't easily shoot myself in the foot whenever I need to?"