systemctl mask systemd-resolved.service
Other services to consider masking if you are not using SystemD for network configuration and time sync., etc.: systemctl mask systemd-hostnamed.service
systemctl mask systemd-timesyncd.service
systemctl mask systemd-networkd.service
systemctl mask systemd-homed.serviceFWIU, per-user DNS configs are still elusive. Per-user DNS would make it easier to use family-safe DNS (that redirects to family-safe e.g. SafeSearch domains) by default; some forums are essential for system administration.
People have weird ideas about how this stuff works.
FWIW, `delv pkg.mirror.server.org` is how you can check DNSSEC:
man systemd-resolved # nmcli
man delv
man dnssec-trust-anchors.d
delv pkg.mirror.server.org
Sigstore is a free and open Linux Foundation service for asset signatures:
https://sigstore.dev/what_is_sigstore/The TUF Overview explains some of the risks of asset signature systems; key compromise, there's one key for everything that we all share and can't log the revocation of in a CT (Certificate Transparency) log distributed like a DLT, https://theupdateframework.io/overview/
Certificate Transparency: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency
Yeah, there's a channel to secure there at that layer of the software supply chain as well.
"PEP 480 -- Surviving a Compromise of PyPI: End-to-end signing of packages" (2014-) https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0480/
> Proposed is an extension to PEP 458 that adds support for end-to-end signing and the maximum security model. End-to-end signing allows both PyPI and developers to sign for the distributions that are downloaded by clients. The minimum security model proposed by PEP 458 supports continuous delivery of distributions (because they are signed by online keys), but that model does not protect distributions in the event that PyPI is compromised. In the minimum security model, attackers who have compromised the signing keys stored on PyPI Infrastructure may sign for malicious distributions. The maximum security model, described in this PEP, retains the benefits of PEP 458 (e.g., immediate availability of distributions that are uploaded to PyPI), but additionally ensures that end-users are not at risk of installing forged software if PyPI is compromised.
One W3C Linked Data way to handle https://schema.org/SoftwareApplication ( https://codemeta.github.io/user-guide/ ) cryptographic signatures of a JSON-LD manifest with per-file and whole package hashes would be with e.g. W3C ld-signatures/ld-proofs and W3C DID (Decentralized Identifiers) or x.509 certs in a CT log.