That does appear to be the claim they made. And it matters. Notably, some "anti-consensus" material out there forwards the idea that electronic tallies were modified, or that secret watermarks or hidden paper composition tricks caused machinery to intentionally miscount ballots. So, manual paper counts are one way of refuting those claims, and the problem of what to do about it when those counts don't seem to make those claims go away because there are parties that push the claims regardless of evidnce is one of public information.
> What it does not mean is that it has been verified that every single paper ballot corresponds to an actual eligible voter and accurately reflects that voter's intent.
Voter registration systems constitute a control that should produce more confidence than skepticism here while maintaining effective privacy. If you try and walk into a polling place where you're not registered, your best case scenario is that you get a provisional ballot which will require review to be counted and likely faces extra challenges, especially in a close or contested election. If you try to walk into a polling place where you are registered and vote multiple times, you're going to have to convince poll workers that they shouldn't have marked you as having already received a ballot.
Similar controls exist for mail-in ballots.
What's your plan for influencing an election at scale by acquisition & submission of ballots that don't correspond to an eligible voter?
I agree that some of your suggestions could provide extra security. Perhaps some should be adopted.
But given that most voices that don't accept Biden's victory don't seem to go as far as pointing out any plausible (let alone proven) mechanics for how the existing system was compromised, I don't think proposed but as yet missing extra layers of are the reason why people don't have confidence in the outcome, and that's reason to think that enhanced security wouldn't solve the real problem, which is one of discourse and disinformation.