The actors have different playbooks. America's is "get in as quietly and as targeted as possible, and make the damage look like random equipment failing." Which makes sense. If they wanted to do value targeting at a wide scale they'd use a nuke or what have you. The mobility the domain of cyber gives them is deniability and operational security, not capability since they can basically bomb anywhere on the planet in under an hour. The dragnet stuff is done via MITM attacks or with friendlies like telcom and tech companies.
With the DPRK it's completely different. They don't have multiple points of access on the global internet. They don't have the worlds best military jets or satellites. Sure they have a few nukes, but they can be intercepted, so getting access to critical infrastructure is something they would value in the first minutes of a war with America.
But I agree with your overall premiss. In cyber you can't get a completely accurate idea of how backdoored your systems are. There is more observability here than people give credit for, because we hack the hackers to figure out their access levels then monitor the intruded on systems, but ultimately it's unknowable just what percentage of our systems are compromised and even if we could somehow know the degree of compromization, it wouldn't matter because a previously unused, wormable 0day could infect whole classes of systems we thought were secure.
Also, I think China does have multiple points of access to the internet, and is catching up with the world’s best jets and satellites (but not entirely caught up).
But I've been following the DPRK for a while, and their cyber strategy is more obvious.