I think one could keep following the turtles right down to the silicon...
I think one could keep following the turtles right down to the silicon...
This is why the whole thing seems like an exercise in futility to me. Just trust a reasonable base (e.g., including the OS) and call it a day. If you can't even trust your vendor to give you trustworthy firmware then find some way to invest $N Billion into your own fabrication labs to make your own chips in front of your face.
And, if you do care about trustable hardware... There are bootstrapping and verification paths available there as well, depending on your threat model.
Or you can of course give up and declare all of computing fundamentally untrustable but still useful for some purposes. Like I said in the post, I'm glad for the existence of both the purists and the pragmatists in this space.
https://puri.sm/products/librem-key/
Interception and firmware replacement is a thing. It happens. One could thus trust the hardware but not the firmware.
Similar, the lower down you go, the harder it is to put that kinds of smarts in.
That might be one reason to stop at this point? (Not sure.)
Solving the hardest problem (or what appears to be it) does not mean that everything else is tractable. In this case, the sheer size of the problem means that it is beyond the scope of one person [1], so the problem becomes one of who you trust, not what you trust.
I think we all knew it was going to come down to this; how does bootstrap.org deal with it?
[1] I'm putting aside the problem of verifying the design of what the fab makes, of the fab itself, and the trustworthiness of the people building and operating it, which is, as you suggest, 'just' another heap of turtles.