Luckily, we only need this for untrusted code. What really peaves me is that trusted code is now having to run slower as well.
Luckily, we only need this for untrusted code. What really peaves me is that trusted code is now having to run slower as well.
I don't like that everything has to get 25% slower because your SSL session setup needs to be protected.
But then again, browser exploits have been a thing forever. I expect that something bad will happen to my computer if I'm visiting shady websites.
So my question is: are shady websites _more_ dangerous now that these side channel attacks have been discovered? (serious question.)
Supply chain attacks exploit that fact that far too much code is inappropriately trusted.
Realistically though, most userland software falls into that category nowadays:
- JS-driven web apps like GSuite
- Sandboxed "App Store" apps on mobile and even desktop
- Potentially any other desktop app that is exposed to content originating from the web or email (e.g. Acrobat, desktop Office, etc.)
I wonder if security models need to become less black-and-white, with a middle tier of trust for apps or domain names that should still be sandboxed but are trusted enough that we're willing to trade some risk of timing exploits for improved performance?