Quick skim and comparing with the OP article, the only concrete takeaway I get is shareholders that hold shares longer potentially have more voting power in your system? Good for founders, potentially (and ironically) bad for the company in the longterm.
I don't have to labor the point on this site that a few successful exits had founder CEO's that needed to be removed by investors/shareholders.
Although an earlier version of our proposal did have a voting-rights mechanism, as part of a one-size-fits-all prescription, we ultimately decided against it. Personally, I was hoping to offer "long-term voting" as a principled compromise between standard governance and dual-class shares. But in the interim, dual-class shares have basically won in the market. I'm still hopeful as an industry we will be able to find better solutions in the future
(I've read that on average, companies run by founders tend to do better over the long term. I'm having trouble pulling up the source though; best I can find right now is the book 100 Baggers, quoting a study saying "there was often a large shareholder or an entrepreneurial founder involved.")