On OTR and deniability
lists.randombit.net
lists.randombit.net
I don't see any 'why' here. Maybe the context of this particular discussion would clarify it. Maybe it's well-known in places I have not read.
I think that perhaps a steganography implementation combined with OTR might provide a very interesting approach to hiding crypto communication and providing reasonable doubt on the transmission's existence.
Perhaps I'm thinking about it narrowly, but that's all OTR is said to do, yes?
If I remember correctly: For the individual messages OTR uses Diffie-Hellman to exchange the key. That means your dialog partner knows the same key, and could have produced the message, too.
But if you want the details, look up http://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/Protocol-v2-3.1.0.html
His points are basically correct but I think a little overblown.
The point of OTR is not to provide you with real-world deniability, but simply to not remove it in one particular way, by not providing additional evidence of the authenticity of a logged communication, beyond what would be available if the communication were in plain text.
There is also some mumbo jumbo about what math should or should not attempt to do. If I'm reading this correctly, it seems like Ian G is also opposed to any system that could do what he thinks OTR allegedly does. Seems like just another opinion to me, not really worthy of much analysis.