I reject the very foundation of the simulation hypothesis: That worlds (can) exist inside other worlds. "Inside" can mean geometrically (physically inside) or topologically (element in a set). That would mean that the "inside" relation is a hierarchy / tree with a root (a true reality). Instead I think of it as a graph, where worlds can observe each other, without any influence on one another, thus there is no need for an origin or root.
Thought experiment: For the sake of simplicity let's say that our world is the game of chess (but the argument can be done for any universe with a set of rules, including ours). The simulation hypothesis would argue that a session of chess is a world and that playing that session on a physical board is a simulation. Furthermore, it would claim that this world exists while it is simulated on the board, by being played. Kicking the board over, ending the simulation would also end the simulated world.
Now, there are many logical inconsistencies here, uncovered by the following questions: - What if I replicate the simulation by playing exactly the same session on a second board? There is only one session but now it has two hosts!? Which one does it exist "in"? - How can I claim that I ended a simulated world, when I can't be sure that nobody else is simulating it somewhere else too? - How can I claim to have done a new unique simulation if somebody else might have already done exactly the same in the past?
The main issue I have is that the simulation hypothesis thinks of simulations as imperative: That the simulation host does invent, change, influence, manipulate, guide the simulated world. I prefer to think of it as functional, it observes where a particular path (which exists regardless) leads without changing the outcome. Thus performing an action on the host merely turns your telescope a bit, so that you now observe a different route but the night sky exists immutably with or without you observing it.