If this so-called "selective default" does end up being "structured" such that markets are surprised when CDSs cannot actually be invoked, then that erosion of confidence in the system itself might end up fueling a cascade failure even worse than simple direct failure of some insurers.
I don't understand. Are 90% of Greek bonds truly held by organizations susceptible to arm-twisting by the ECB to the tune of 54 gigaeuros?
How long is that charity coalition going to hold together once they see others collecting on their CDS policies?
My guess is that something more than 10% those Greek bonds are held by entities which, in reality, are for-profit corporations with shareholders that know how to do a little arm-twisting of their own.
After all, why would the world spend $B on CDSs and then not invoke them when it came down to it?
Ah : But that demonstrates how terrible CDS is, and how amoral hedge funds are. Actually (IMHO) the fact that Greek CDS was so cheap to buy was just an indication of how little trust people have that politicians respect the law in European countries. It would have been far cheaper to have sorted through this mess on day one, rather than spending taxpayer funds giving Greeks a lifeline when the changes that they have to make were always inevitable.
And now the politicians words have been demonstrated to be completely worthless, there'll be a lot more pain - in countries where it might otherwise have been unnecessary.
CDSes are generally used to hedge a position. If a hedge fund holds both Greek bonds and CDSes on those bonds, they come out ahead regardless of what happens to Greece.
A bank might be short Greek debt because of other trading positions, and want to sell Greek CDS to balance that position. Restricting who can buy that security hinders it being priced right.