This whole ‘now that they have a scanner it’s easier’ reasoning doesn’t make sense. iOS already had numerous better matching algorithms if your goal is to do general spying.
It can target a pride flag just as easily as CP.
It’s way more complex than that, and has been engineered to prevent exactly that scenario.
I recommend you actually check out some of Apple’s material on this.
The idea that it’s just a list or fingerprints or hashes that can easily be repurposed is simply wrong, but is the root of almost all of the complaints.
I feel like you may not have actually read the paper in depth. The paper clearly shows this is a generalised solution for detecting content that perceptually matches a database. The "what" is CSAM today, but nothing about the technicals require it to be CSAM.
To answer your specific response of safety voucher and visual derivative:
- The 'safety voucher' is an encrypted packet of information containing a part of the user's decryption keys, as well as a low resolution, grayscale version of the image (visual derivative). It is better described as "backdoor voucher".
- The 'visual derivative' is just the image but smaller and grayscale.
None of those two technologies have anything to do with CSAM. Apple's statement that they will only add CSAM to the database is a policy statement. Apple can literally change it overnight to detect copyrighted content, or Snowden documents, or whatever.
> Apple can literally change it overnight to detect copyrighted content, or Snowden documents, or whatever.
No, Apple doesn’t run the database. NCMEC does.
Also, in the US, the 4th Amendment protects against the abuse you are talking about:
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2021/08/12/a-38-year...