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Describing the implementation details does nothing to change the reality that the device is acting as an informant against its owner. The number of hoops literally changes nothing. Adding an AI model versus using SHA sums changes nothing. Adding some convoluted cryptography system to implement some additional policy changes nothing. In trivial cases like anti-piracy measures or anti-cheat in games, we tolerate that the device will sometimes act against our best interest, but at least in this case, the stakes are low and the intentions are transparent.

We have every fact we need to know to know this shouldn’t be done, and I’m glad that privacy orgs like EFF have already spoken much to this effect.

> Yes, it could theoretically be abused if Apple went to the dark side, but we'll have to see what this 'auditability' that he was talking about is all about.

Or we can just short circuit the entire issue by deciding firmly we don't want this and punish Apple's behaviour accordingly. Which is what appears to be happening.

> it feels as though we should give Apple the benefit of the doubt

It really doesn't feel like this to me at all. Users have clearly stated: we don't want this. It's time for Apple to simply pull it all back and apologize.

> Once the images and tokens are uploaded to iCloud photos, iCloud will alert if 30+ of those security tokens show a match, it will alert Apple's team, and they will get access to only those 30+ photos. They will manually review those photos, and if they then discover that you are indeed hoarding known child pornography then they report you to the authorities.

Apple: We have 29 matches on your device of "known CSAM"[0]. However, despite our confidence level being very high, we won't report it to the authorities because we value your privacy!

[0] for varying definitions of 'known CSAM'.

> This isn't a surveillance feature.

> Thus, it would be more accurate to say that apple is putting on your device code which can detect known child pornographic images

> If you don't like it, disable iCloud Photos.

> Yes, it could theoretically be abused if Apple went to the dark side [...]

> [...] it feels as though we should give Apple the benefit of the doubt at least until we have all the facts.

No, nobody gets "the benefit of the doubt". The very use of that phrase admits that you are being put into a situation where you could be screwed in the future.

There is zero transparency or oversight into the code that does the scanning, the in-person review process, or the database of images being scanned for.

They created a tool that, in principle, lets a government ask about certain hash matches that are on the iPhone but not necessarily on iCloud, correct?

There is no way to determine whether the hashes are about CP or about HK protests.

> Yes, it could theoretically be abused if Apple went to the dark side, but...

> ...we should give Apple the benefit of the doubt...

You have to take off your apple branded rose tinted glasses my friend.

Any company as big as apple needs to be scrutinized as harshly and critically as possible.

Their influence on the world is so big that a botched roll out of this sort of tech could be absolutely devastating for so many people, for so many reasons.

I don't care if it's hashed tokens or carrier pidgins. We should only allow companies to act in ways that improve our lives. Full stop.