This entire "secure tickets that unlock a derivative of your photos so we can review them" system would, in this interpretation, be there as a way to neuter law enforcement objections[1] to no longer being able to serve warrants for the contents of your photo library.
Now, will this actually happen? Hard to say.
[1] There was a story last year claiming that Apple wanted to turn on e2e, but the FBI got them to drop it. https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/security/a306318...
I'm not saying I necessarily agree that this is better, all-told (mixed feelings), but I think it's worth acknowledging why a rational actor might consider this superior to Google doing whatever the fuck they want with anything you upload.
Apple has the keys in escrow across several HSMs separate from the cloud hosting environment. Nothing within iCloud can actually see the content, but there are processes to get access to a particular account for various reasons (such as government order). There is a separation of permissions as well as hardware-generated audit logs. Reportedly the HSM systems were specifically manipulated to not be extensible via software updates.
So it is E2E with a separate key escrow system, which Apple (wisely) does not attempt to call E2E.
Apple couldn't implement the PhotoDNA-based scanning other providers have done because Apple would need access to the escrowed keys for each user photo uploaded.