But this article is about a system for giving up passwords under duress without necessarily compromising all your security, such that your antagonist has no way of knowing or showing that there's another password concealing more important information.
If “those guys” are your adversary, you were fucked before you started.
Complying in the face of threats of physical violence is equivalent to "being easily swayed"?
You seem to have a pretty specific threat/defense model that you didn't clarify. I wouldn't generalize from that to "biometrics are bad for all users in all situations".
What I'm saying is that if such threats are unacceptable to a person, chances are they are not going to involve themselves in the sort of activities that require keeping secrets in the first place, or are sufficiently disciplined to have weak device security because they don't write anything down.
How, exactly? And "require users to watch out for shoulder surfing and use strong passwords" does not count.
Any chance you are thinking about pretty specific circumstances here (security-aware, technical employees generally not having to enter passwords in public spaces)?