Perhaps we need a new term, other than E2E encrypted, to close the door on 'loopholes' such as the provider managing your keys.
Perhaps we need a new term, other than E2E encrypted, to close the door on 'loopholes' such as the provider managing your keys.
In this case Apple can do anything they want with the keys since it's a locked down and closed platform.
You can't trust anything unless you built it yourself [0]. Just because I tell you that binary is built from the source code does not mean it's not backdoored.
[0] Theoretically, reproducible builds provide the same security, but in the end you need to build it yourself to get the hash, at which point you just replace one `cp` with two `sha256sum`.
With closed systems, the best you can hope for is to treat it like a black box that can and will change out from under you.
99.999% of open source projects rely on Github Actions, Circle CI, Travis CI etc to build their code. Those are all proprietary so unless you are running your own CI/CD stack then you can't trust the code.
And of course every open source project relies on libraries. So you need to make sure this applies equally to them as well.
Security comes in layers, and with open systems, if you want to, and if you have the resources, you can audit and verify those layers depending on your level of paranoia and your potential adversaries.
You might throw your hands up in the air because security isn't assured and go all in on closed, black box systems, but there is value in open systems when it comes to security.
[1] https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_Ref...
It's like if you're trying to figure out how a magician does a trick, "he must have a collaborator in the audience" is a reasonable guess. "Everyone in the audience other than me is a collaborator" is usually not.
As "Reflections on trusting trust" (https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_Ref...) points out, you can't trust anything including if you built it yourself, at least assuming you mean 'build' in the software sense. Even in the hardware sense, it's probably beyond the reach of anyone, let alone any individual actor, to build a modern computing machine from bare metal in a way that involves no trust of a third party.
It’s silly not to call it E2E, since e2e just means that no eavesdropper in the middle can intercept it.
If you don’t trust the person who wrote the software you are using, that is a different issue. Just as serious, but it has nothing to do with either it is E2E or not.
You know where the ends are. As I said, you always have something between you and the ‘end’, and you always have to trust someone.
Whether something is E2E or not is completely independent from whether you trust your software.