Stuff like this is, on the contrary, evidence that the NSA can't break modern cryptography. If they could, they wouldn't need to try to push through blatant backdoors like this.
If you want to be safe from the NSA, use well-vetted, simple, auditable cryptography tools. The NSA doesn't break real crypto any more, they just find or make software bugs.
The only "thing the NSA has probably broken" that comes to mind in the modern crypto world is when people realized that you could do a one time mass computation for fixed parameters for n-bit Diffie-Hellman and then use the result to decrypt any communications that that used them, efficiently... which was a bit of a problem when tons of software around the world was using default parameters, often 1024-bit, which is in "the NSA can almost certainly break it" range. I remember when that happened, I went through all my servers and re-generated my own dh parameters for OpenSSL, at 4096 bits. But this wasn't a particularly mind blowing idea, it was more like an "oh shit" moment since everyone knew the NSA had the storage/compute budget to actually carry out this attack. But anyone serious about crypto shouldn't have been using 1024-bit DH anyway; it was just a failure of the ecosystem that nobody had proactively deprecated such small sizes.