Something you know. Something you have. Something you are. Known passwords of any type are all in the first category, and they will always be highly phishable, and using more than one of the same factor will never be "multi-factor."
Something you know. Something you have. Something you are. Known passwords of any type are all in the first category, and they will always be highly phishable, and using more than one of the same factor will never be "multi-factor."
The problem is the communication channel isn't bound to the authentication context the way it would be with a fido key. But that could be a flaw with any type of authenticator (albeit its much easier to seamlessly fix with other types) - its not about what type of factor it is.
If it's something you have, well, probably a key right? A usb key? But it's a code on the USB key.
If it's something about you (voice, fingerprint, etc), or a location, it's ultimately something represented as information.
That's not to say it's a bad philosophy or less secure. It's better, not worse. But it seems to be conceived of and framed in a way as though it's appealing to something other than stuff that gets turned into computer-accessible information.
The one "hard" category that seems to make sense to me has to do with hard-wired networks, and having to be in a physical place to access a system that is not online. That creates a real distinction that doesn't boil down to some form of computer-comprehensible information.
To your later point, some later versions of these original authentication factors have added "somewhere you are" to the list.
The otp is proof that you "possess" the otp secret.
Then again, it's a shared secret - so if the server side is compromised - all bets are off. Here client certificates/public key crypto does better.
Not really. People don't "know" their totp secret or their RSA secret key.
But yes, when these key-style secrets can be transfered - they behave more like "know of" than "in possession of".
The simple mitigation is probably fido2 auth tokens.