A true counterexample is pure interaction without words, akin to what dogs and other animals do (excepting things like recognizing their name), or meditative state where the conscious mind is no longer driving.
Words provide an information-space regularity mapping to similar constructs in other minds, a shared "game" with shared (crowdsourced) rules.
This, in turns, allows the cognitive chunking of words/ideas mappings so that they can in turn be used as constructs within larger intentional chunks, largely automated by your brain machinery, so that you don't even have to be aware of the syntax, only the semantics.
A world without words would be like navigating in an ocean without lighthouses and stars: anything is possible, but you never really know where you are and where anything else is (including others' minds)
Human-level reasoning requires something like language, for generality. Particularly, to reason about reasoning - to argue, to see the argument of another, to see their point of view, to trade disimilar things, to "see where you went wrong", to deceive.
It's analogous to: animals are FSA; we are TMs.
You can argue for the intelligence of other animals, but they can't argue for yours.
This distinction (between non-abstract and abstract entities) already becomes blurred when it comes to things like colors. In their case your quip starts to break down - contrary to our intuition, it turns out that you do need the word in order to experience the concept. To some extent at least.
It's been proven that - even though colors exist on physical level - languages (vocabulary) do have an impact on how humans perceive them.
Eg. "Researchers found that Greek and Russian speakers, who have dedicated words for light and dark blue, were more likely to see a light blue triangle against a dark blue background (and vice versa), than they were to identify green triangles against green backgrounds. Speakers of German, which has no such distinction, were no better at seeing shades of blue triangles than green."
You: "No. You can meet people and get to know them without learning their names."
I'm confused, as I can't see how your observation - insightful as it is - is supposed to contradict what I wrote.
Did you not read my comment in full, or is there something I am missing?
I have always had strong doubts about the latter position, and I do not think it can survive the challenge presented by the sort of cases presented in this article.
With knowledge by acquaintance or experience (including of pain), we grasp the concept before we have a name for it, and the name is an optional relationship. I am well aware of this because I have a small problem remembering names, but when it happens, it does not interfere in any other way in my knowledge of that person. When it happens, I have, indeed, temporarily forgotten a name that I once knew (or at least lost conscious access to it), but it seems plausible that most of what I still know about them could have been learned without ever knowing their name.
Language can supplement our experience in at least a couple of ways: we can learn some concepts that might, in principle, be learned by experience, but we have not actually done so (this is not quite the same, however, which might explain my yearning to visit places with an interesting history, even if everything from that time have crumbled to dust, and so, intellectually, I realize that such a visit will not lead to significant new insights.) Secondly, it is not clear to me that one could gain abstract concepts such as the square root of -1 or entropy by language-free experience alone, which I think is the thesis expressed in the article's title.
[1] Stanley, Jason and Timothy Williamson, 2001, “Knowing How”, Journal of Philosophy, 98(8): 411–444. doi:10.2307/2678403
Like, the whole of 3D space, physics, object permanence, etc are most definitely not learnt through language at all (though arguably, we might have some innate knowledge on some of these categories? I believe 3D objects reliably break down into the same basic 3D shapes in all humans)