I give an encrypted laptop/ machine and I want the other party to prove that having access to the device = no security and so they can read data out of it.
No if, no but: I give the machine, show me that having it=no security.
In most cases the adversary would choose to use their physical access at a time when you will use it again afterwards, so they could install a hardware keylogger. Cases where you will never use the machine again are more the exception than the rule.
I dare say that the comment has merely been used as a vehicle for a facile pedant.
Now if you don't get the laptop back, your data is as secure as the encryption implementation of your OS.
I'd bet it's secure enough against anything that is not the NSA / equivalent foreign agencies. Now would I bet against those big players? Certainly not.
Which is another shortcut that boils down to saying "nothing is secure".
I have a beef with broad statements like that :].
Even if the math is bulletproof, are you sure the software implementation is bulletproof too?
Even then, maybe there's something in your hardware that defeat the whole thing, who knows?
When the stakes are so high that this kind of agencies are trying to get your data, that would be a risky bet to assume they won't be able to crack your encrypted partition.
I'm pretty sure if you ask them nicely to give you a few of their old encrypted hard drives they wouldn't comply. Why not?
> When the stakes are so high that this kind of agencies are trying to get your data, that would be a risky bet to assume they won't be able to crack your encrypted partition.
I do agree. Even if I knew the NSA was after me and I knew how to secure my laptop with custom Libreboot and other things I strongly believe the laptop should not be used to discuss matters or store data related to activities that got the agency on my back. I will do an humane error and compromise myself before they need to use strong tech against my laptop.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine
>The Intel Management Engine always runs as long as the motherboard is receiving power, even when the computer is turned off. This issue can be mitigated with deployment of a hardware device, which is able to disconnect mains power.
>The Intel ME is an attractive target for hackers, since it has top level access to all devices and completely bypasses the operating system. The Electronic Frontier Foundation has voiced concern about Intel ME and some security researchers have voiced concern that it is a backdoor.
> Intel's main competitor AMD has incorporated the equivalent AMD Secure Technology (formally called Platform Security Processor) in virtually all of its post-2013 CPUs.
You can buy boards with it disabled, some Dell devices have the option to disable it, some flashing can be done on mobos to clear ME unofficially, but assume everything has it unless you only otherwise.
It changes the scope from "access to device = no security" to "access to device by NSA people with a very specific set of skills and most likely some prep work = no security" and I won't fight it, it's right. Not possible for the random HN user though and it still means some very specific circumstances.
Circumstances that need someone to compromise my laptop at some point after it got out of the factory. From reading the Wikipedia article it's not clear ME leaves a backdoor or store user passwords or keys somewhere on the computer in case an NSA agent needs to access data.
I think my encrypted devices are safe, unless the NSA or a nation state wants its data.