Why would it be legally invalid to exclude blondes or people with a brother named "Mike"? (Obviously it would be immoral and stupid, but that doesn't make such an exclusion legally unenforceable.)
I have no idea how that law would apply to this license though.
> All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
The important part is "All persons ... are free and equal ... and are entitled to ... equal accommodations".
When you read it this way (which is how the courts read the law), the list is just illustrating some classes that might be discriminated against. It does not limit the classes merely to those listed.
As you can see from links/quotes elsewhere in this thread, the caselaw agrees with me.
Corporate status is not one of these.
[1] https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml...
> (b) All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
In interpreting statute, a list of things is generally assumed to be exclusive unless there are specific words that indicate it is to be treated as nonexclusive--and those words are missing here.
> [3] The nature of the 1959 amendments, the past judicial interpretation of the act, and the history of legislative action that extended the statutes' scope, indicate that identification of particular bases of discrimination--color, race, religion, ancestry, and national origin--added by the 1959 amendment, is illustrative rather than restrictive. (Stats. 1959, ch. 1866, p. 4424, § 1.) Although the legislation has been invoked primarily by persons alleging discrimination on racial grounds, its language and its history compel the conclusion that the Legislature intended to prohibit all arbitrary discrimination by business establishments. Finally, in 1961 the Legislature substituted "all persons" for "all citizens" (Stats. 1961, ch. 1187, p. 2920, § 1) in order to broaden further the section and complete the consistent pattern of wide applicability of the section. [4]
E.g. Consider a similar legal exclusion to only people called Nguyen or Mohammed or Singh.