Second in the lectures he said that he uses frequentist techniques all the time and that it's often worth looking at it from each perspective.
I interpreted it as his problem is not with the methods themselves, but with how they are commonly used in science. To me this made a lot of sense.
But in some places, it definitely comes across as hostile (e.g. footnote 107).
Also, the sentence "Bayesian probability is a very general approach to probability, and it includes as a special case another important approach, the frequentist approach" is pretty funny. I know the exact technical result he's referring to, but it's clearly wrong to gloss it like that.
He does mention consistency once, page 221, but (unconvincingly) handwaves away concerns about it. (Large N regimes exist that aren't N=infinity...)
But I could see how someone might take this as an attack on the methods themselves.