Annexing Crimea gives them a port that doesn't freeze in the winter other than Murmansk. But they could stop there and everybody in NATO would shrug their shoulders and they would keep Crimea. Why insist on further escalation?
In short, Russia has no intention to conquer Ukraine, but Russia has vital strategic interest there. With its actions it pursues to block eastwards expansion of NATO by wrecking the candidate states.
At the same time, NATO policy is quite contradictory: Ukraine is not a vital strategic interest for USA, and thus NATO was not ready to fight for it in Donbass. At the same time they are happy to offer Article 5, which will oblige them to engage in the future conflicts in this area.
Policy of open doors that NATO declares does not make much sense: by design it supposed to be a defensive alliance, not an empire, so why inviting countries which won’t really contribute to your security?
Russia has no strategic interests
But Russia has a president who is:
- a matric fail
- who spend most of his youth in mafia, running drugs, and stealing humanitarian aid
- who conducts himself accordingly to what you expect from those kind of people
As an American living in Ukraine, I can say that that the guy in the video obviously don't know Ukraine he's talking about.
He starts off from NATO expansion and Russian position on that. But little did he know that before 2014 (Crimea and Easter Ukraine war), no one here seriously thought of NATO. Russia was the biggest economical partner. NATO was considered no-quite-friendly entity, composed of foreigners, why joining?
Everything turned upside down after 2014 -- Russia basically pushed Ukraine into NATO (although NATO made it clear they don't see Ukraine as their member as well, their idea is to increase members safety, not decrease it). If Russia didn't annex Crimea, it would be simply impossible.
Also he is wrong on how Russia quickly moved to Crimea in 2014. He is unaware that preparation for annexation began in 2011 (working with local governments and municipalities), it wasn't quick, it was planned (very well planned to tell the truth), and everyone here knows that.
As a befuddled onlooker myself, I am surprised that the movements of the Russian military inside its territory must be interpreted by the outside world as an escalation. I understand the nervousness of Ukraine, but not of the US. If Russia invades, then by all means, the West can destroy it economically; but until it does, what is the point of all this saber-rattling?
Just as I don't understand the point of NATO's eastwards expansion, which, in turn, makes the Russians nervous. If the European countries are worried by the military buildup along Russia's western border, surely it must be easy to empathise with the Russian worry about Nato including more Eastern European countries and being able to deploy missiles there, which can be used both defensively and offensively and which puts Moscow within 5-minute reach, or something like that.
Russia is pretty large (and Ukraine too), it may look like the forces are "near Ukrainian borders" on the map (when zoomed out), but it can be as far as 350 km (at its widest, UK is 500 km, for comparison), which is deep into Russia's most populated territories.
I left out the places I've heard about amassing troops in Crimea as I believe troops reinforcement there wouldn't necessarily be preparation for invasion but could reinforce Russian grip in Crimea.
I don't believe amassing troops 15-80km away from any border wouldn't be seen as "close to the border", no matter the size of the country, even for the Netherlands and its tiny landmass it would be very curious to see something like that happening.
I don't believe either you'll be able to find open information with such granularity, reports were never about 100k personnel 15km away from Ukraine, that's a strawman, the 100k figure is about all the troops amassed around Ukraine's borders (Crimea + eastern border + northern border with Russia + Russian troops amassed in Belarus on Ukraine's northern border, etc.), so obviously that no, there aren't 100k troops barely 15km away from Ukraine, that in itself would be an extremely alarming escalation...
If war starts, securing water supply to Crimea is one of the first steps they would do.
Russia is most populous in the Western areas near Ukraine, so certain military activity in that region doesn't necessarily mean a plan for a full-scale invasion. It borders 14 countries, so there's always movement of the Russian military near someone's border.
NATO's eastward expansion makes Putin nervous, so it's understandable why he would want to strengthen the Western border.
What kind of eastward expansion, exactly? The last western neighbors of Russia joined NATO in 2004. The tiny states that joined 2017/2020 are further away from Russia. You need to pass at least 6 borders if you want to reach Northern Macedonia from Russia.
Because these formerly Russian-occupied countries want to defend themselves from a future Russian occupation.
You can see many comments here questioning why the west should care about Ukraine given that it's not part of NATO. Well, that's why all those countries, and more now, want to be part of NATO.
This explains why such countries would want to join NATO, but not why NATO would want to take them in and be committed to defending them from external aggression. Not every country that expresses an intention to join NATO is accepted. Consider that in mid-nineties, Russia, then under the pro-western president Yeltsin rather than the isolationist Putin, asked to be accepted into NATO, but was rejected [0]. So Russia — at least as it complains to the rest of the world — finds itself sitting next to a growing hostile military alliance whose main historical purpose was to confront the USSR, which no longer exists, but which Russia perceives itself to be a successor to.
[0] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/dec/31/russia-assoc...
To bring Russian military movements in spotlight. Otherwise they will manufacture some pretext (stage a provocation or just claim they are defending me (Russian-speaking person) from raging Ukrainian nazis) and will muddy the water with misinformation campaigns. German and French governments will happily accept Russian reasoning because they don't really care about Ukraine and just want their cheap gas to flow. Current media attention makes it much harder for European leaders to just hold some post factum Normandy-format-or-whatever "peace" talks (giving Russia more and more Ukrainian territory in the process) without some level of condemnation from their electorate.
> Just as I don't understand the point of NATO's eastwards expansion, which, in turn, makes the Russians nervous. If the European countries are worried by the military buildup along Russia's western border, surely it must be easy to empathise with the Russian worry about Nato including more Eastern European countries and being able to deploy missiles there, which can be used both defensively and offensively and which puts Moscow within 5-minute reach, or something like that.
This is the narrative that Russia is pushing, but it makes no sense if you think about it for a second. NATO could have accepted Ukraine long ago (they had 7 years to do that even after the last war), if it just wanted to deploy missiles here. It seems like NATO goal is to not accept Ukraine (and Georgia) for as long as possible without stating this straight up (in order not to discourage peoples of these countries from pro-Western course, I guess). In fact, joining NATO was very unpopular in Ukraine until Putin's actions changed that.
I have two questions about this, and I am asking honestly, because I don't understand any of this shit. One, if NATO had no intention of accepting Ukraine and Georgia, why wouldn't it (or whichever countries are responsible) commit to this as Russia wants it to. That would defang Russia's false narrative about NATO expansion. And the other, if you are offering an argument from a counterfactual (NATO could have accepted Ukraine long ago, as you say), why didn't Russia, if it intended to devour Ukraine, do so seven years ago when Ukraine was at its weakest? Arguably, both Ukraine has become a tougher nut to crack since then, and the international community has agreed on how best to punish Russia if this happens again.
Why would they and what would Russia give them in return? Just allowing Russia to effectively obtain veto-power over NATO membership by threatening non-NATO state would be political defeat for the West, not to mention that existing NATO member countries from Eastern Europe would be opposed to this for obvious reasons.
> That would defang Russia's false narrative about NATO expansion.
This narrative is only needed to confuse Western electorates (there are some "But Russians just afraid of NATO aggressive posture and only want to feel secure!" people even in this discussion). After isolating Ukraine it would be easy for Russia to leverage the resentment that Ukrainian people would undoubtedly feel after being rejected by West like that in order to further destabilize Ukraine by using it is propaganda talking-point ("We were telling you that West have been using you all along!") and by sponsoring pro-Russian politicians which have hard time getting to power in current political climate. If that fails they can always use old-good "protecting Russian-speaking people" narrative to justify invasion.
> And the other, if you are offering an argument from a counterfactual (NATO could have accepted Ukraine long ago, as you say), why didn't Russia, if it intended to devour Ukraine, do so seven years ago when Ukraine was at its weakest? Arguably, both Ukraine has become a tougher nut to crack since then, and the international community has agreed on how best to punish Russia if this happens again.
I don't think that real full-blown occupation is their goal (more like a last resort). They just need to destabilize Ukraine (both politically and economically) by staging a quick campaign that results annexation (de jure or de facto) of more territories. If in the process they get land corridor to Crimea, then it would be a double win.
I also don't fully understand the point about the destabilization either. Does Russia destabilize all its neighbors, and why would it prefer an unstable neighbor to a stable one?
I don't see a contradiction here: Yes, Ukraine and Georgia would very much like to join and no, NATO doesn't want to admit them. In fact, NATO has been denying their requests for membership since at least 2008 when Ukraine applied.
> and that the alliance leaves the door open for Ukraine and Georgia. As long as that's the case, how can you say that Russia's story is false and just invented to sidetrack the trusting Westerners?
Don't you think "leaves the door open for the future" is quite different from imminent danger of missile deployment? It is clear that NATO won't admit countries with territories occupied by Russia (they had 14 years to do that with Georgia and 7 years with Ukraine), so feigning being threatened by that is just a pretext. Also, look at the map and ask yourself why NATO don't just deploy those missiles in Latvia.
> I also don't fully understand the point about the destabilization either. Does Russia destabilize all its neighbors, and why would it prefer an unstable neighbor to a stable one?
Are you really asking in good faith? Obviously, Russia prefers stable pro-Russian autocratic neighbors and are willing to destabilize any governments that don't conform to that definition until more fitting government can be established.
They have had ports that don't freeze: Novorossiysk and Vladivostok.
I grew up in Eastern Europe, and I see it as the ages-long Russian policy -- more territory = good. All the way from Mongols conquest, they kinda continue what Mongols did.
Imagine a thug standing nearby, playing with his brass knuckles menacingly. A skinny college boy gets really nervous and tries his best not to provoke the thug.
Seeing the Russia situation from inside, I don't see how this new war is in Putin's interests. However, the West is unable to read this game and Putin plays the incapable leaders of the Europe and the US really well.
Clearly it won't be in his interest. But if the West does not provide him with some major concessions -- will he do it anyway? To protect his image, or whatever?
That seems to be the key question here.
* Fulfils his old goal of expanding Russia to old soviet borders (see Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea etc).
* Distracts from internal problems with an external enemy (a tried and true tactic of dictators)
* Provides a buffer from Nato and Europe (long a preoccupation)
The bet here is that the West will do nothing if he takes Ukraine. Given the current messaging from the US and Germany (Embassy evacuations, disposition of fleet, Biden slipup Fri, 5000 troops), he's probably right.
You don't move this many troops and ships etc as a feint (nor would you need to), the die is already cast, and the only uncertainty is what the West will do about it IMO - at present it looks like not much, as they didn't do much about Crimea.
Worst case for Putin is a long war which bleeds the country of money and resources, so he'll want it over quickly and a puppet ruler installed, at which point he can withdraw and plan to slowly absorb the Ukraine or leave it as a satellite state like Belarus.
I think that Putin has lost a chance to grab the eastern Ukraine in 2014. When Yanukovich fled Kiev, he could have made him ask for a military help, and in the post-maidan chaos could take everything east of Dnepr, creating a puppet state loyal to a legitimately elected president, and then slowly incorporate those territories into russia over the next few years or decades.
Also, do not equate Chechnya, Georgia and Crimea. Chechnya was an internal region with no international recognition ever, so this is an internal matter, and it's not so much 'grabbing territory' as 'restoring order'. Taking territory from Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, etc is a different matter and is seen by state propaganda as bringing the rightful territory back into the fold.
I think given the public statements demanding absurd terms from the west and the very public troop movements Putin would now find it very hard to back down.
So no, it's not Machiavellian, more like a gopnik who stole a TV set while the neighbors were putting out a fire in their house.
Of course you can equate. Russia has a history of supporting separatists immediately outside of their borders, while cracking them down when they're just across inside. You can directly compare their completely opposed stances in North and South Ossetia.
Russia created what I call Schrodinger's jihadists: you can't know if someone is a terrorist or a freedom fighter until you observe on which side of the border they are and the threat function collapses. Basayev in Abkhazia? Good. Basayev in Chechnya? Bad.
Why do you equate such conflicts with conflicts between different nations is hard for me to understand.
As for completely opposing stances, that's politics for you. Ever wondered how certain member of Bin Laden family came to prominence?
• Pre-industrial society with widespread slavery, with most of the agricultural production of the union, trying to secede because they don't like the new rules.
Against a:
• Turn-of-the-21st-century, religiously-motivated, terrorism-mediated secession with testimonial cases of slavery in a tiny post-industrial subject of the Russian Federation (and the poorest of them all).
Is not only wild, but also a gigantic tu quoque, especially when you have plenty of analogies right there in the Caucasus: Abkhazian independence good, Dagestani bad; South Ossetian independence good, Ingushetian bad.
That's reality of Russia saying and doing the opposite immediately inside/outside of their borders.
As for "X good, Y bad", every conflict in history is rooted in different understanding of what's good and what's bad by different groups of people. For Georgia, Abhazian independence bad, for Russia, Dagestan independence bad, as they both claim soverenity over these respective territories. I don't understand why are you talking about it in such grandstanding fashion, it is not some groundbreaking news.
So no, you can't equate internal Chechnya wars with international conflicts like Crimea and Georgia. These are two very different conflicts with very different reasons.
I agree, but you know what? The best feints are the believable ones, and even moving 100k troops is cheaper than actually engaging in war.
I completely agree Putin and his backers are entirely focussed on pillaging Russia and surrounding countries for wealth but part of that is ensuring he maintains control of that wealth, and false patriotism and war is one way to do so more easily and to expand the wealth available.
Which I read as a direct continuation of pre-communist imperial ambition. When whites turned red they mostly just dropped their loyalty to the Romanov, keeping other elements of imperial attitude basically unchanged. And to this day there seems to be the idea of a "historical injustice" that deserves correction wrt places that used to be under Romanov rule at some point but subsequently got independent.
On the one hand, they claim any talk about an invasion is absurd hyperbole, on the other hand they demand security guarantees or else.
Or else what? Like, if an invasion won't happen under any circumstances, then what exactly are they threatening to do if the demands are not met?
Also, Biden's "minor incursion is one thing" remarks kinda opens the door to explore this "thing" a bit further.
Last time (Crimea 2014) it greatly improved Putin political position within Russia.
This makes no sense. Of course it costs money to move troops, resources, and cargo thousands of kilometers.
> I don't see how this new war is in Putin's interests
Besides the obvious goal of combating NATO expansion and taking control of the Black Sea, isn't Ukraine also sort of a threat to Russia? You've got a country with soldiers less than 800km from Moscow that is cozying up to the West and developing ICBM technology. From a military strategy perspective it makes sense to turn it back into a buffer zone.
The edge of Romania/Moldova are where the great plains start. Meaning if you get natural trade routes from that region on its a very easy march to Moscow.
Second, it is a test of the US to put up resources. It is a challenging time for the US to do so, so it just makes it expensive not to do so. I.e if the US does not and Russia invades it makes the US look very weak and it can seize on that. It is a very standard/typical balance of power move.
Thirdly, covid has been bad in Russia so projecting power looks very strong to maintain leadership. In Russia's history this is just a very common thing to do to maintain power in government.
In all it is a very optimal play for Russia to do. Any leader other than Putin wearing the 'Bear suit' would basically do the same.
Crimea was 90% ethnic Russian as were the majority of areas occupied by rebels. This is an ethnic conflict that started when the majority Ukrainian areas decided that they could rule the country without the majority Russian areas.
I imagine what we will see is North Ukraine being left as a majority Ukrainian speaking country and South Ukraine a majority Russian speaking country. Ironically enough North Ukraine then becomes small enough to join the EU.
I have a couple of questions for someone not that familiar with Ukrainian history:
- Was the south ukrainian population relocated there as a soviet 'settlement' or were they always historically there?
- Is there any political acceptance among north ukrainians to cut their loses and lose territory in order to be able to join NATO/EU?
If anything, Stalin and Kruschev gifted Lvov (1940), Ivano-Frankovsk (1940), the entire Crimea (1954), Uzhgorod (1945), etc etc to Ukraine, so some thanks to the Soviets should be in order.
Ukraine is very similar culturally to Russia. Putin cannot afford to have a successful democratic Ukraine on his borders as an example to Russian citizens. They might decide that Putin's way of governing is not actually the best for the Russian people. So, he does everything he can do to undermine a democratic Ukraine. If a western style democracy fails in the Ukraine, well, clearly it is not suitable for Russia either. Ideally, he would like Ukraine within Russia's sphere of influence as Belarus is, but I am not sure that is vital.
This is actually fairly consistent with how the Soviet Union behaved in Eastern Europe. Romania and Yugoslavia moved away from the Soviet Union, but they were dictatorships, so they were left alone. Anytime there was even a glimmer of democracy, however, the tanks were sent in.
And, lastly, probably good old fashion Russian incremental expansionism.
It is just convenient (Biden's domestic issues/Nordstream 2/other unknown reasons) to claim imminent invasion and the media is incentivised to fuel that narrative since it seems to have captured the attention of the populace at large (perhaps based on the Russophobia that is prevalent in mainstream media).
Yes, there were deployments previously, but never this size.
Anyway my point is that the initial clamour of "imminent invasion" was unwarranted based on the evidence at the time based on historical troop movement at the border. Therefore there must be another reason underlying the media's outcry which is beyond my ken.
Russia imported a shit tonne of food from the Ukraine until this all started. Russia doesn't want to lose that supply permanently.
The current partition isn't the best from a strategic/defense position or from a political/objectives one. So it makes sense to correct that before making it permanent.
Negotiations for a peaceful settlement have failed or are stuck.
Now (roughly) is the peak demand for Russian gas in Europe so it's now or wait another 12months.
And that's without considering domestic political reasons for conflict...
They say, they stopped there - and that they will not tolerate a military occupation of the autonomous eastern ukraine provinces. Not that they want to occupy whole ukraine.
So I do not see them insist on further escalation. But the west has said - it will not accept the crimea annexion. So this conflict will remain unsolved, if no side will move.