It is far less unrealistic than you think.
It is far less unrealistic than you think.
Scale numbers to make better financial sense.
Now, one would think there are already more non-NSO security researchers than NSO have, who earn money from bounties and report issues to Apple. Yet NSO has a business model. How?
0: https://jobs.apple.com/en-us/search?search=%22red%20team%22&...
Because Apple's security is actually pretty bad, making their job easy.
No they can’t. If Apple could, they would deploy their war chest billions to do so. People often make the mistake of thinking some objective is money-constrained, and a place like Microsoft could’ve just thrown the most money at mobile in 2008 to be the best mobile OS.
The Israeli’s in these national security level positions work like their life depends on it because they literally believe it does. Good luck replicating that with a gazillion teams of cushy big tech Silicon Valley positions.
NSO makes money reselling the same set of productized exploits. Their business model depends on no one else (apple or other researchers) finding it. Selling an exploit gets you a single payday, selling a service lets them both charge market rate for exploits, but keep doing so.
Honestly I wouldn't be surprised if they had a monthly subscription fee.
> This is not how security works.
what do you mean?
ime this is absolutely how security works regardless of your defense strategy.
*Yes, you do everything in VMs, with a transparent interface.
You do though. You can exploit flaws in the hypervisor to escape the VM and then you've bypassed the Qubes security model. Here's one such example: https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/08/15/qsb-32/
Extreme compartmentalization through virtualisation is also insufficient, as it just becomes a matter of “is there a bug in the hyper visor”, to which the answer is yes: every major VM system has had multiple escapes, as another commenter pointed out even your example of qubes os has had them.
I know how hard security is. I know how hard writing bug free code is.
Brushing that aside and saying “just do X and bugs don’t matter”, assumes that somehow the people implementing support for X are immune to the same problems faced by other developers.
iOS isn't. The vulnerability in iMessage led to the whole system compromize.
> every major VM system has had multiple escapes
Qubes uses hardware (VT-d) virtualization, which AFAIK was last time broken by the Qubes founder in 2003: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Pill_(software).
Every other virtualisation system also uses hardware virtualisation. They’ve been popped. I don’t think it’s unreasonable to suspect that qubes has not had the same degree of offensive interest as, say, VMware.
I would be grateful if you could provide some links.
> I don’t think it’s unreasonable to suspect that qubes has not had the same degree of offensive interest as, say, VMware.
Qubes relies on Xen. The latter definitely had a lot of offensive interest. I am not aware of any recent escapes of hardware virtualization though.