Extreme compartmentalization through virtualisation is also insufficient, as it just becomes a matter of “is there a bug in the hyper visor”, to which the answer is yes: every major VM system has had multiple escapes, as another commenter pointed out even your example of qubes os has had them.
I know how hard security is. I know how hard writing bug free code is.
Brushing that aside and saying “just do X and bugs don’t matter”, assumes that somehow the people implementing support for X are immune to the same problems faced by other developers.
iOS isn't. The vulnerability in iMessage led to the whole system compromize.
> every major VM system has had multiple escapes
Qubes uses hardware (VT-d) virtualization, which AFAIK was last time broken by the Qubes founder in 2003: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Pill_(software).
Every other virtualisation system also uses hardware virtualisation. They’ve been popped. I don’t think it’s unreasonable to suspect that qubes has not had the same degree of offensive interest as, say, VMware.
I would be grateful if you could provide some links.
> I don’t think it’s unreasonable to suspect that qubes has not had the same degree of offensive interest as, say, VMware.
Qubes relies on Xen. The latter definitely had a lot of offensive interest. I am not aware of any recent escapes of hardware virtualization though.
> This is not how security works.
what do you mean?
ime this is absolutely how security works regardless of your defense strategy.
*Yes, you do everything in VMs, with a transparent interface.
You do though. You can exploit flaws in the hypervisor to escape the VM and then you've bypassed the Qubes security model. Here's one such example: https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/08/15/qsb-32/