The moral hazard was the smallest of the problems. The complexity of how to do so seems like the much bigger issue. What does "buying homeowner debt" even mean when much of that debt has been securitized?
To pay mortgages? Set standards for when it would do it, and then open up public applications.
I don't find the argument that "it's hard to track and manage that" valid or compelling for an organization which includes the IRS as one of its constituent parts.
Actually paying portions of mortgages would both keeps the banks solvent as well as keep the people capable of pulling through with assistance from taking the burden of the problem because of what might be temporary issues (a recession and lack of work). It's a much more market based solution than "throw money at banks", in that it doesn't subvert the market entirely, just supplements it.
They would still need to allow people that had no hope of paying their mortgage to lose their homes, and something different might be needed for that to keep that subset of the problem space (which might be a large subset, a lot of lenders were fudging number to get people into homes they couldn't afford) from still causing things to spiral out of control, but there was no guarantee that the first part of TARP was going to be enough either, so it's not like "the situation needs to be closely monitored for future needed intervention" wasn't an assumed part of any proposed plan.
Doesn't this article highlight what happens if you haphazardly throw together a complicated relief effort overnight? The money ends up in the pockets of the rich anyways.
>Actually paying portions of mortgages would both keeps the banks solvent
Exactly, which is part of the problem I'm highlighting. Under this arrangement, the lenders and mortgage backed securities holders don't get punished at all. If the homeowners get to keep the their home, that means the lender gets everything that they asked for. If the homeowner receives government assistance and loses their home anyways, the lender still ends up with government money. Lenders are literally getting rewarded for their reckless lending.
Presumably with TARP, the Treasury negotiated the purchase prices with the banks to make sure that they were punished, but not so much they'd collapse.
It's a somewhat subtle but I think very important distinction that needs to be considered in these discussions of the rich benefiting in these instances. It's almost impossible to prevent people other than those targeted from benefiting, and those with the most flexibility (which comes with money) are those most likely to be able to take advantage in some way of programs not aimed at them (if you help people in poor physical health by supplying money for physical therapy, companies that offer that service will benefit). Trying to prevent that at the expense of the people you're trying to help is not beneficial to anyone (especially since economically the input resources and output outcomes are not always linearly related).
Preschool is like a 9-12x return on investment; it's bonkers.
do you have evidence of increasing funding to public education directly resulting in better outcomes in general? obviously better schools are usually better funded, but i can't imagine how throwing money at a bad school would result in better education...
...what?
How about hiring better teachers. Building nicer facilities. Funding extracurricular/after-school activities. Smaller class sizes. Better equipment (computers, technology, textbooks). Better/more support staff (counselors, etc).
The list goes on... I would much rather go to a school that had plenty of money than go to a school that was on a tight budget. And yes, I would almost certainly get a better education at the former.
So if I make reckless decisions because I am greedy, the govt should bail me out and then if some of my investments work out in the end I can return the govt's money.
Its heads I win and tails I dont lose strategy.
I'd also point out that it was not the riskiness of the assets that the government bailed out. It was the complexity of valuation that reduced the short term liquidity in those CDOs and other collateralized and securitized debt products. When they were actually unwound, it turns out the risk was lower than people thought it would be.
Yes that was the same argument used by Alan Greenspan when he said investment banks dont need regulation because they wont take risks that are irresponsible, yet Lehman and Bear Sterns and others imploded because they did not understand the risks. This is precisely why you should not socialize the losses, if they fail let them fail or else you regulate them so they they dont take excessive risks.
> It was the complexity of valuation that reduced the short term liquidity
It was so complex that the bankers themselves did not understand it.
You’re considering secondary effects, which would have also happened with the money loaned to the banks.
Do you even know what trickle down economics is? I’m guessing no and that’s why you didn’t post any sources. Long story short, it’s about taxation policy, which has zero overlap with “loans for banks vs handouts for poor people”.
Quote, you. The effects of such a thing simply aren't the same. Poor people aren't helped when you give folks money at the top - which is, after all, what the taxation policy does. It isn't uncommon to include things that aren't strictly taxation in this.
https://www.politico.com/news/agenda/2022/01/19/minority-own...
844B stimulus checks, 666B unemployment compensation, 145B other income security, 828B for paycheck protection (money lent to business to pay paychecks - goes to the people nearly as directly as the stimulus, and allows business to stay afloat)....
It doesn't count the tax credits and other things that added to citizens handouts.
A lot of the other categories went also directly to paying citizens. Read some about what happened.