Let's Encrypt finally solved that, but at the same time effectively made SSL certs mostly worthless for identity purposes (as it just means the domain you're talking to is the domain you're talking to).
Let's Encrypt finally solved that, but at the same time effectively made SSL certs mostly worthless for identity purposes (as it just means the domain you're talking to is the domain you're talking to).
Not to mention that it's never been difficult to get a certificate for a dodgy domain, especially when doing so made a phish more likely to succeed.
Which was and is reasonable, given that encryption mitigates risks that can't be mitigated otherwise, and is therefore a more pressing concern for security -- you can take many other measures to verify who the party on the other end of a connection is, but once unencrypted traffic exits your network, there's not much you can do to prevent snooping.
It again goes back to muddling up these two separate concerns. If we used CA-issued certificates only for identity validation, we could have optimized them for that purpose and not diminished their value because the need for ubiquitous encryption was a higher priority. Meanwhile, we could have just had web servers auto-generating encryption keys (a la SSH, as you point out), without being shackled to the trust hierarchy, and had universal adoption of HTTPS 20 years ago. Instead, we got a single solution to two different problems that is still forcing us to compromise one for the other.
If you're browsing via HTTP there is no expectation at all that what you are doing is secure.
If you have a problem in HTTPS, you are expecting to be secure, you might not be. Hence, a warning.
A bad certificate is a sign that something's actively wrong while (at least historically) no certificate doesn't really give a strong signal.
A cert that's a day out of its expiration time has zero implications to the confidentiality and identity of the parties to the connection. The same cannot be said about a bad CN or signature.
Most browsers really want to show scary warnings for HTTP connections these days. But there are enough complaints about it as a concept that they have not implemented it yet.
“Zero trust” or “BeyondCorp” security strategies are not widely deployed; a lot of organizations still use browsers over HTTP for internal apps, and don’t have a captive CA or a way to satisfy Let’s Encrypt challenges from outside the firewall. No one wants thousands of companies to train their employees to ignore cert warnings.
And there is a small but vocal set of folks who believe one should not have to satisfy a CA (even Let’s Encrypt) to put up a website.
If you don't manage employee devices AND can't get TLS certificates to internal applications, the employees are right to be scared by the browser's warning. You have failed as a corporate IT department.
* Visiting site with HTTP, there's no expectation of encryption / comms security. So there's no need for warning.
* Visiting site with HTTPS, there's expectation of encryption / comms security, so please let me know if it's not working as intended or there are warning signs.
That being said, I'm at the crossroads of "little knowledge is a dangerous thing". Vast majority of my friends and family would not know HTTP is not encrypted... but they also won't even bother reading an experied cert warning and will just click to proceed.
(on a broader level, working in operations has underlined to me that default user behaviour with any modal dialog, window, warning, error, is to click everything until something works. There is no reason whatsoever to read or understand WHAT was clicked, or pay it any attention later, other than remembering which thing was clicked. It's an entirely binary world of "things that when you click them don't make it work" and "things that when you click them make things work". There is literally no other useful information for most users)