Comment by keleftheriou | Hacker News Reader

Comment by keleftheriou | Hacker News Reader

Wholly agree that the App Store itself can become better when sideloading comes to iPhone.

But here’s where I don’t quite agree with the author:

Sideloading doesn’t necessarily mean the platform would be any less secure than it is today. It could, if Apple were to do it exactly as macOS does it today, but that’s not the only –or even the most obvious– option.

Apple could still require the iOS sandbox to be in-place at all times, with no option to ever disable it (unlike on macOS where entering an admin password can let all hell break loose).

And notarization –which could also be enforced at all times– can include the exact same malware-scanning steps that App Store apps have to go through. In fact, that’s what it already does for macOS apps today:

> Notarization is a malware scanning service provided by Apple. Developers who want to distribute apps for macOS outside the App Store submit their apps for scanning as part of the distribution process. Apple scans this software for known malware and, if none is found, issues a Notarization ticket.

https://support.apple.com/guide/security/protecting-against-...

The whole debate is shrouded by a lot of FUD and not a lot of actual case studies. A lot on the "keep iOS closed from sideloading" proponents seem ignorant of the many security features that iOS have to begin with, that the App Store isn't the only means of protection.

Plenty of us know about the private Enterprise branded app stores that any company can create, they just have to have a Mobile Device Manager certificate and have bought the right type of Enterprise developer certificate.

And yet these Enterprise app stores are still a target for malware developers, because most people don’t understand what it means to install certificates, and once their certificate is installed, the rest is easy. Even the notarization is relatively easy.

Bang — you’ve got your own malware App Store, and now your grandmother can finally install her favorite recipes or game apps. And meanwhile, the malware App Store can install anything else they like on her device.

This is a real threat. It has actually happened before. And there are plenty of malware authors out there that are trying the same thing on a regular basis.

You just don’t hear about this sort of thing very often, because Apple doesn’t talk about it very often.

What’s the hard numbers for the scope of this threat? What are the case studies of prior instances of enterprise certificate store exploits?

The threat vector of third party app stores, whether from rival FANG big companies or from phantom enterprise cert app stores, still makes assumptions on user behavior. Good luck getting even tech enthusiasts to be quick to jumping on rival app stores, and dealing with the whole rigamarole of setting up new memberships, payment accounts, and purchase histories. Much less the so-called “grandma” demographic. The App Store would still be preeminent even if iOS was to open up to sideloading. Simple consumer behavior would prevent masses of users from departing from a system that’s over a decade old. Thus that vector is mitigated.

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