Comment by EdSchouten | Hacker News Reader

Comment by EdSchouten | Hacker News Reader

What I never understood is why the entire discussion revolves around the concept that the kernel gets launched in a vacuum where it is responsible for generating its own entropy. Why can’t the kernel (or the boot loader) restore/reload state from somewhere? I don’t buy the argument that it’s hard to build that.

- For virtualized systems there could be a hypervisor call to request an initial random seed.

- Run of the mill desktops/servers could use a reserved region (partition or boot record field) for preserving RNG state.

- On embedded devices a boot loader like uBoot could load state from some piece of NVRAM/NAND/…

There are hardly any platforms out there that are stateless in the literal sense. All of those approaches above would allow Linux to have a properly seeded RNG from the very first instruction that runs. No need to fully rely dubious things like timing execution/interrupts.

A lot of these things do exist. Desktop/server Linux systems (used to at least) save some output from the PRNG to disk on shutdown and load it back on boot.

But of course snapshots, cloning, etc. can foil that badly, causing the same seed to be used multiple times. And on initial install you're not going to have any of that (but initial install is also when you may need to generate long-lived random numbers like ssh host keys).

Embedded devices it can be a real challenge. You must not re-use the seed data, so you effectively have to erase it from NVRAM/flash before use. But then if you lose power before you can generate a new one, you won't have one next boot. And you're adding flash writes, which decreases longevity and increases the chance of power failure in the middle of a write.

Qemu/KVM has a virtual RNG so you can feed host randomness into the guests if you want. So there are hypervisor calls available.

Some applications really need to be stateless. What if you don't have wear leveling because you're on some bizzare embedded thing?

You could have a one-time written random seed though, which would be enough when combined with an RTC, and would probably still be enough when combined with the almost universally present HWRNGs built into everything now.

RTCs themselves nearly always seem to have about 56 bytes of memory, but I'd hate to see half of that used just for RTC, I'd rather it be exposed to applications via the FS somehow.

But, it could be enough for a 64 bit counter, which would be combined with a one time written secret.

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