You can file the whole line of thinking - from design to support - under "worst practices" and "things not to emulate in your own product".
When it comes to handling how unverified author identity is presented and cross-reference, Github could stand to do a lot better.
Fortunately, the problem appears confined to Github's web interface; a git show --quiet e83c516 still produces
Author: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Thu Apr 7 15:13:13 2005 -0700
Initial revision of "git", the information manager from hellIf the only real security around attribution is "a cryptographic signature", GitHub could do a lot better in pushing this, making it essential part of the signup or "getting started" and such.
and how exactly would this be out of character for the real Linus Torvalds?
Sure if you clone the git repo you get the e-mail address, but then you also won't get any information about who the email belongs to on Github.
I don't see how the design of Git affects this issue. This is simply one if clause away from being solved in Githubs frontend source code. Just check if email.verified: display the user, else, don't do that.
In the else-case all you'd get is a situation where one unknown user has Linus e-mail in their list of e-mail addresses, in Githubs DB, and a bunch of git commit logs with the same e-mail. No one would ever make the connection from the commit log to the list of Emails in the DB. Because the e-mail hasn't been verified. It's as simple as that to me but I could be wrong.
But if there's no record of someone at all then there isn't an easy way to detect this kind of abuse.
no? git just has an email field on the commit. it's github that has decided to allow people to associate unverified emails with their accounts, and also display this association whereever the email is listed in a commit.