This is part of a pattern with this author. They're extremely attached to PGP. PGP uses RSA. Therefore: RSA must be fine. Recurrence of the same pattern: PGP doesn't use authenticated encryption. Therefore, authenticated encryption must not be important, or maybe it's even a negative. There's another example somewhere in the comments here about forward secrecy being overrated. (I can cite, but you should just take my word for it that these takes have been shared here).
It's frustrating, because the pattern isn't super clear in isolation (though this response actually mentions PGP as the impetus for the response) and, if you don't work in the field, it might not be clear how far these takes stray from cryptographic engineering orthodoxy. It's also frustrating because in general, we're not supposed to write things like this on HN --- a list of floridly bad previous comments from this author would be way over the line --- so one has to sort of tiptoe around the edges of the guidelines to find a way to describe what's going on here.
Anyways, caveat lector.
Hats off for describing Boneh's fault attack paper as "completely theoretical", though! Bold!