Hacker News Reader

Comment by Freestyler_3 | Hacker News Reader

I would assume most nukes are small tactical nukes. Initial nukes will focus on nuclear launch facility's, command and control.

So I think a significant amount of nukes will not be used at all.

View on HN

The US has only one model of nonstrategic nuclear weapon (about 100 gravity bombs); most US, Russian and Chinese nukes are large strategic “city busters,” due to the dynamics of the Cold War. If one country genuinely believes that a strategic counterforce salvo was launched, the only “winning” (!) move would be to empty the silos in a mass countervalue attack, depopulating the enemy state. This, of course, implies that if you’re going to launch an attack and you think your enemy has a robust second-strike capability, then you go all the way first, because they’ll do the same to you.

There’s a rich and horrifying literature on nuclear bargaining that’s suddenly relevant again, right up to a bunch of people (particularly in Russia) rehashing old HAK theories about being about to control the nuclear escalatory ladder in the midst of combat. It’s not a comforting time right now.

I read something recently that suggests that Russia thinks it could not prevent a US counter-strike even with a full Russian first strike, which makes a full first strike by either side pretty unlikely, since the US posture seems to be no first strikes. In which case, the next most likely scenario might be: A destroys a city, B destroys a city in response, and then A tells B: "we are retaliating one more time, how about we stop after this?" And then everybody stops because the alternative is worse.

I wish I could remember where I read it. It still isn't particularly comforting, but maybe better than the all-out-nuclear-war scenario.

US boomer subs are incredibly stealthy and can operate anywhere in the ocean, including spending much time and effort practicing under arctic ice (see the Ice-X series by SmarterEveryDay). I have no doubt US has the capability to camp subs under the ice, send launch codes via low frequency radio, surface and bring enough hurt to devastate Russia. The ability of Russia to effect a full decapitation first strike is on the order of nil.

Hi Joe, your buddy Putin is on the line - I am about to launch a missile on New York. Do me a favor do not launch full scale counter attack in return. But feel completely free to drop one on St. Petersburg.

IMO once you’re into countervalue strikes you’ve unleashed something you can’t really control, so I’m skeptical of the game theorists who think you could kill everyone in Boston or St. Petersburg and still have a diplomatic conversation that isn’t fueled by bloodthirsty revenge. As one US wargame AAR mordantly put it after accidentally killing off a few billion civilians, nuclear weapons are not the best way to communicate intent, even in a tabletop exercise.

Unnervingly, Russian (and Soviet) policy has always assumed a smooth ramp from conventional to nuclear war and back, while US policy since Kennedy has seen nuclear escalation as an irrevocable step change in warfare (more reassuringly, China is, like the US, also unlikely to add nukes into a conventional conflict).

Russian doctrine therefore encompasses using a limited demonstration strike to compel an end to conventional hostilities on Moscow’s terms. It’s hard to imagine NATO not responding, though, because the obvious effect of not responding is Europe living under Russian control enforced by the constant threat of nuclear destruction. What that response would look like is uncertain, though warplans certainly exist, but it would absolutely set us up on an escalatory spiral.

> Russian doctrine therefore encompasses using a limited demonstration strike to compel an end to conventional hostilities on Moscow’s terms.

What Russian doctrine says this? This sentence is a complete fabrication.

HillRat is not alone it seems:

https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russian-military-doctrine-ca...

Sidorenko’s work is a good place to start, as it demonstrates the significant amount of effort (relative to NATO forces) that went into creating a Soviet doctrine of nuclearized ground warfare. But Russia has actually leaned more aggressively into limited nuclear use (starting with the 2000 MoD doctrinal review), since they’ve lost the relative advantage in conventional military mass that the Warsaw Pact had over NATO; in current Russian thought, the use of tactical nuclear strikes to control the political progress of war is a more important component of their perceived correlation of forces than in the days when they could overrun NATO in the Fulda Gap in hours with armor and artillery. (NB, prior to JFK’s New Look retool, the US policy in Europe was nuclear retaliation against Soviet conventional assault, so for a decade or so the US, and very much its European allies, were much more willing to use nukes than the Soviets.)

Over the last decade, Russian leadership has repeatedly floated public hypotheticals (including the Zapad military field exercises) in which nuclear threats (or, in their war games, simulated nuclear strikes) are used to deter NATO from operations “beyond the edge of the Russian empire” (such as majority-Russophone regions in the Baltic states), which is in keeping with an evolving strategy generally termed “escalate to de-escalate” in the West. In fact, where Western game theorists developed an intricate theory of nuclear deterrence vs compellance, the Russian literature refers to both using сдерживания, seeing threats to compel and threats to deter as functionally identical, strategically speaking. (Compare with the PLA’s “Science of Military Strategy,” both editions of which discuss the PLA’s nuclear arsenal in deterrent terms in the event of a general war in East Asia against Western forces.)

This is what unnerves game theorists about the Ukraine war and Russia’s poor performance there — if it weren’t for global public opinion (crucially China and India at this point), their doctrine certainly encompasses an escalatory demonstration strike (a tactical-yield weapon on a largely uninhabited area of farmland, for example) used to quickly “de-escalate” the war, freeze the lines at a position of relative Russian advantage, and force Ukraine into negotiations.

You are gravely mistaken. The nuking of launch facilities means that each side will have to launch almost its entire arsenals within 15 minutes, guaranteeing a very large exchange to avoid having your own weapons become crippled. The dynamic leads to dramatically more detonations, not less

That would have to mean that ALL nukes are on launch sites ready to be deployed.

Reply on news.ycombinator.com