The idea of land-value tax strongly reminds me of the often cited, and much maligned, so-called fiduciary duty to shareholders which CEOs and/or board members reportedly have. This duty creates, it is said, an incentive towards naked short-term greed, which is often described as a bad thing. Now, even though this duty is also usually derided as fictional, the argument, if this duty did exist, would be reasonable. But does not a LVT create the same incentives in landowners – in essence forcing landowners to always use the land in a way which extracts the maximum amount of money from it? Why then is a LVT a good thing while the duty thing would be bad (if it did exist)?

Note: I am making an analogy not with what fiduciary duty actually is, but instead with the idea of it which people usually argue against. People usually say that fiduciary duty creates and even enforces thoughtless short-term greed, and argue that is bad for society and also the company in the long run. Regardless of what fiduciary duty actually is in reality, how is then LVT any different from creating the same short-term enforced greed?

A LVT would tax a plot of land by what use it could theoretically be put to in order to make the most money. And this is evaluated individually for each plot of land, with no regard for what would actually happen in reality if every single plot of land would actually be put to use in the most money-making way. Would a LVT not force a monoculture of, say, only lofts, where previously each landowner might have opted to allow things like nightclubs or the occasional park or other forms of variation and whimsy? If you tax every land owner as if they have the maximum possible income, do you not essentially force every landowner to implement that way in order to acquire it?

(Adapted from texts originally written here:)

• https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25319095

• https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25324577

• https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25319594