The percentage of income invested fluctuates, based on factors that include security of property rights and expected return on investment.
Creating a reliable regulatory and tax regime would mean greater annual inflow of money into investments.
>>historically, disenfranchised masses revolt, violently.
All the better then to remove the obstacles to the enfranchisement of the masses, by offering compensation to the current beneficiaries of rent-extracting institutions in exchange for recruiting them in the drive to abolish these institutions.
Violent revolutions that overturn power structures are actually quite rare and far more common is persistence of structural forces of rent-extraction for decades or centuries, and thus the threat of revolution is not an effective motivator for those in power to relinquish their privileges. The pragmatic reality is that we are more likely to get to a more just and efficient economy without these structures if we reach a settlement that removes the opposition of these structures' beneficiaries from the drive to eliminate them.
>>bonus point: a more equitable distribution of wealth would lead to smarter investment overall and a more productive economy.
Another bonus of eliminating rent-seeking institutions is that it reduces wealth inequality. Compensation to expedite the removal of a structural force that contributes to wealth inequality would likely be a net-gain for equity in the distribution of wealth, because the former is a one-time action while the latter has a recurring impact.